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The statute gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the
[sentencing] finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense. 1
When a judge's finding based on a mere preponderance of the evidence authorizes an increase in the maximum punishment, it is apas "a tail which wags the dog of the
propriately characterized
2
substantive offense."
What this means in operation is that the law must not go too far-it
must not exceed the judicial estimation of the proper role of the
judge. 3
I.

INTRODUCTION

VER the last seven years, in what is commonly referred to as the
Apprendi line of cases, the United States Supreme Court has
promulgated an audacious and controversial constitutional law
of sentencing characterized by thinly veiled disdain for legislative sen1. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986). The unaltered quote reads: "The
statute gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the visible possession finding
to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense." The challenged statute, upheld
as constitutional by the Supreme Court, required imposition of a mandatory minimum
penalty pursuant to the sentencing judge's finding that McMillan had "visibly possessed a
firearm" during an aggravated assault offense. See id. at 81-82 & n.1. Actually, McMillan
had done much more than simply visibly possess the gun; in fact he had fired it, shooting
his victim in the buttocks. See id. at 82.
2. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 495 (2000) (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at
88).
3. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306-07 (2004).
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tencing reform measures and high regard for judicial discretion in punishing offenders. 4 The Court's opinions have asserted that its newfound
constitutional principle is necessary to safeguard defendants' Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury against legislative encroachment. In
truth, the only interest being preserved is judges' assessment of their own
importance.
The doctrinal and practical effects of the new sentencing doctrine have
been profound. Although the Court has sustained the validity of some
sentencing measures, including a statutory mandatory minimum punishment in Harris,5 the broader course of its decisions has invalidated most
forms of common and politically popular sentencing laws that limit judicial sentencing discretion, such as a statutory sentence enhancement in
Apprendi and a system of mandatory state sentencing guidelines in
Blakely.6 In 2005 the doctrine culminated in a "coup de grace" against
legislative authority: the ruling in Booker that the application of sentence-enhancement provisions in calculating punishment under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is unconstitutional unless the Guidelines are
given only advisory, rather than mandatory, effect on the decisions of
7
sentencing judges.
Blakely and Booker in particular have exposed just how hopelessly
flawed and analytically bankrupt the proffered Sixth Amendment analysis is. The principle set forth by the Court has become absurdly formalistic to the point that when it is applied to the determination of individual
sentences, it now produces divergent outcomes in otherwise identical
cases. The Court's expressed justifications for its constitutional analysis
cannot explain this troubling development, but examining the true constitutional interests at stake does.
Deciding upon an individual offender's particular sentence is not a unitary exercise, but in fact consists of three separate and distinct decisions:
the adjudication of offense element facts, the adjudication of additional
punishment facts, and the determination of the punishment value of those
facts. Different constitutional interests are implicated by each kind of determination, yet too often the necessary analytical precision is lacking in
the Court's opinions. The tripartite analytical framework reveals that beneath the superficial camouflage of its Sixth Amendment analysis, the
Court in fact has decreed as constitutional law a specific, contestable, and
highly controversial normative vision of the nature of criminal
sentencing.
4. In order of decision, those cases are: Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S.
224 (1998); Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227
(1999); Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466; United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002); Harris v.
United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Blakely, 542 U.S.
296; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
5. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 568-69.
6. Blakely, 542 U.S. 296; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497.
7. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227, 245.
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On one level the Court's vision has pronounced a new balance of
power between legislatures and judges concerning the adjudication of offense elements and additional punishment factors. The Court has reduced
legislative and prosecutorial power, but it has not shifted that power to
the trial jury; instead it has shifted that power to the sentencing judge.
Seen in this light, the real function played by the Court's principle is not
protection of the jury's province in criminal cases, but instead the protection of the sentencing judge's authority to pass judgment on individual
offenders. At this level alone the Court's conclusions are subject to numerous critiques. It is far from clear that anything in the Constitution,
much less the Sixth Amendment, mandates the Court's conclusions about
this aspect of the nature of sentencing.
But the Court's vision of the nature of sentencing is not limited to issues of institutional balance of power in adjudicating facts. It strikes at an
even deeper theoretical controversy concerning the most basic objectives
of criminal sentencing. Imposing a sentence upon a convicted offender
also requires the determination of the punishment values of the facts and
circumstances that exist in any given case. That is, it must be decided
how much weight each proven fact carries in assessing the severity or
leniency of the punishment appropriate to the particular offense and
offender.
Beneath all discussions of sentencing reform lurk two fundamentally
irreconcilable normative positions regarding the objective to be pursued
in making determinations of the punishment value of facts. One maintains that justice is served by ensuring that the appropriate degree of individualized punishment is imposed based on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. The other, a prominent legacy of contemporary sentencing reform debates, maintains that justice is served by ensuring systemic equality across all cases so that similarly situated defendants
are given similar sentences. Just as it has imposed a certain vision of the
institutional balance between judges and legislatures, so too the Court
has restricted attempts to reconcile these competing normative positions.
For all its silliness, then, the Court's canine metaphor-that the sentencing "tail" must not "wag" the offense "dog"-nonetheless successfully isolates the fundamental issue of constitutional criminal procedure
involved in the Apprendi line of cases, the constitutional law of sentencing, and debates about sentencing reform generally. The offense of conviction has paramount status; sentencing is a secondary, derivative
enterprise. The tail is important, but ultimately it is the dog that is in
control. So too with the constitutional law of sentencing, which must ensure that the offense of conviction wags the sentence, and not the other
way around.
The metaphor also helps to illustrate the flaws in the constitutional law
of sentencing promulgated by the Court. The terms of the debate about
the reasoning of the Apprendi line of cases and the future of sentencing
reform must be changed. Discussion of Sixth Amendment formalisms

20071

The Constitutional Law of Wagging

must be replaced with deliberation over the proper institutional balance
of power in criminal sentencing. Likewise, debate over procedural requirements for adjudicating facts must not be allowed to obscure the
deeper controversy over the objectives to be pursued when determining
the punishment values of those facts. Otherwise the Supreme Court's unilateral imposition of particular doctrinal and normative choices-about
what counts as the dog and the tail, and what counts as unconstitutional
wagging-will go unanswered.
II.

THE APPRENDI RULE AFTER BLAKELY AND BOOKER

The Court's new constitutional law of sentencing flows from its adoption and implementation of the Apprendi doctrine ("the Rule"). Deceptively easy to state but much more difficult to understand and apply in its
nuances, the Rule provides the following: "Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."8 The Rule's constitutional source, and its
application to sentencing laws, have been explained and elaborated in the
Apprendi line of cases, most recently in Blakely and Booker.
A.

SOURCE OF THE RULE.

Throughout the Apprendi line of cases, the Court has described the
Rule as deriving from the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury in
criminal cases. 9 For example, in Blakely the Court stated that its "commitment to Apprendi in this context reflects not just respect for longstanding precedent, but the need to give intelligible content to the right to
a jury trial. That right is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental
reservation of power in our constitutional structure." 10 Viewed in these
terms, the Rule's requirement that certain sentence enhancements be
proven to the trial jury is not simply a resolution of a disputed question of
procedure regarding the identification of the finder of fact and burden of
proof. Instead, the purported constitutional defect in statutes that violate
the Rule is an infringement upon the trial jury's prerogative to adjudicate
the defendant's guilt of the charged offense and thereby also create exposure to the punishment available for that offense under the law.
8. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. The recidivism exception-"other than the fact of a
prior conviction"-is analyzed in other sources. See Benjamin J. Priester, Structuring Sentencing: Apprendi, the Offense of Conviction, and the Limited Role of ConstitutionalLaw,

79 IND. L.J. 863, 876-78 (2004); see also, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, ConceptualizingBooker,
38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 418-19 (2006); Daniel Doeschner, Note, A Narrowing of the Prior
Conviction Exception, 71 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1333 (2006). A majority of the Court no

longer supports the existence of the recidivism exception, however, so its overruling may
be imminent. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
9. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 235-37; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301-02, 305-14; Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 476-90; id. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 500-23 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
10. Blakely, 242 U.S. at 305-06.
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It is the jury's verdict of guilty-or the waiver of that right in a guilty
plea-that exposes the defendant, now the convicted offender, to the
penalties enacted for the offense of conviction.' As the Apprendi Court
explained:
The historic link between verdict and judgment and the consistent
limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the limits of the
legal penalties provided highlight the novelty of a legislative scheme
that removes the jury from the determination of a fact that, if found,
exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum
he would receive if
punished according to the facts reflected in the
12
jury verdict alone.
Sentence enhancements that violate the Rule, therefore, are tantamount
to convicting the defendant of an aggravated offense without proving that
greater charge to the trial jury beyond a reasonable doubt as the Sixth
Amendment mandates. By insisting that such enhancements be treated
identically with criminal offenses and their constituent elements, the Rule
ensures that it is the offense dog which wags the sentencing tail.
B.

APPLICATION OF THE RULE

The Apprendi Rule imposes a limited, highly formalistic constitutional
constraint on the sentencing of a convicted offender. 13 The Rule mandates that those factual findings which determine or increase the "statutory maximum" penalty for a crime must be established as elements of
the offense-that is, either proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial or admitted by the defendant pursuant to a guilty plea. 14 When applying the Rule to statutes that define offenses or regulate sentences, "the
'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in" the offense
elements so established. 15 Legally binding, nonstatutory provisions of law
that restrict a judge's sentencing discretion, such as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, also create "statutory maximum" sentences for purposes
of the Rule. 16 On the other hand, the Rule does not completely prohibit
the consideration of sentencing factors-that is, additional findings of fact
made by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence at a sentencing
hearing-so long as they do not alter the "statutory maximum" penalty,
but rather determine the appropriate sentence within that Apprendi max11. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478-83.
12. Id. (emphasis omitted).
13. Other sources provide thorough and detailed analyses of this aspect of the Apprendi Rule. See Priester, supra note 8, at 873-75.

14. See, e.g., Booker, 243 U.S. at 231, 244; id. at 795 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Blakely,
124 S. Ct. at 2537; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602-04 (2002).
15. Booker, 243 U.S. at 228 (quoting Blakely, 242 U.S. 296); see also, e.g., Ring, 536
U.S. at 588-89, 597; Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
482 n.9, 483. When statutes are involved, the Rule applies not only to those provisions that
expressly define offense elements, but also to those provisions that are labeled merely as
regulating sentences. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 602-05; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-78, 491-96.
16. See Booker, 243 U.S. at 227, 231-33; Blakely, 242 U.S. at 303-04.
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imum. 17 Thus, even after Blakely and Booker, the Rule leaves significant
room for the determination of an individual offender's punishment on the
basis of facts that were not established as elements of the offense.
1. Defining Statutory "Maximum" Sentences
The Rule applies to statutory provisions that link the severity of the
penalty for an offense to specified facts relating to its commission. 18 For
example, the federal carjacking offense provides for a sentence of up to
fifteen years' imprisonment, and for an enhanced sentence of up to
twenty-five years' imprisonment if serious bodily injury results from the
carjacking. 19 In Jones the Court held that the Rule required that the fact
of serious bodily injury be established as an element of the offense before
a sentence longer than fifteen years could be imposed. 20 Similarly, the
New Jersey criminal code in Apprendi provided for a sentence of five to
ten years for a weapons offense, and for an enhanced sentence of ten to
twenty years if the offense was committed as a hate crime. 2 1 The Rule
invalidated a sentence of twelve years because the hate-crime motive had
not been established as an element of the offense.2 2 Likewise, the Arizona statutes in Ring compelled the finding of additional facts to justify
17. See, e.g., Harris,536 U.S. at 549-50, 564; Ring, 536 U.S. at 611-12 (Scalia, J., concurring); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476, 478, 494 & n.19.
18. Prior to Blakely, the scholarly commentary on the Court's analysis already was
growing rapidly. See Stephanos Bibas, Back from the Brink: The Supreme Court Balks at
Extending Apprendi to Upset Most Sentencing, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 79 (2002); Stephanos
Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87 IOWA L. REV. 465
(2002); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Findingand Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001); Stephanos Bibas, Comment, Apprendi and the
Dynamics of Guilty Pleas, 54 STAN. L. REV. 311 (2001); Nancy J. Gertner, What Harris Has
Wrought, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 83 (2002); Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: You Say You Want a Revolution?, 87 IowA L. REV. 615
(2002); Joseph L. Hoffmann, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future?, 38 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 255 (2001); Kyron Huigens, Harris, Ring, and the Future of Relevant Conduct Sentencing, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 88 (2002); Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90
GEO. L.J. 387 (2002); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apprendi and Plea Bargaining,54
STAN. L. REV. 295 (2001); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 1467 (2001); Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer, Searching for the "Tail of the
Dog": Finding "Elements" of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATTLE
L. REV. 1057 (1999); Andrew M. Levine, The Confounding Boundaries of "Apprendiland": Statutory Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 377
(2002); Alan C. Michaels, Truth in Convicting: Understandingand Evaluating Apprendi, 12
FED. SENT'G REP. 320 (2000); Benjamin J. Priester, Constitutional Formalism and the
Meaning of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 281 (2001); Benjamin J.
Priester, Sentenced for a "Crime" the Government Did Not Prove: Jones v. United States
and the ConstitutionalLimitations on Factfinding by Sentencing Factors Rather Than Elements of the Offense, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249 (1998); Priester, supra note 8; Stephen A. Saltzburg, Due Process, History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 243 (2001); Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of Sentencing Guidelines: Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REV.775 (2002).
19. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 230-32 (1999) (interpreting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119 (1988 & Supp. V)).
20. See id. at 251-52 & n.11; see also Ring, 536 U.S. at 600-01.
21. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69, 474.
22. See id. at 491-97; see also Ring, 536 U.S. at 601-02. Apprendi was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70.
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the death sentence, rather than life imprisonment, after a capital murder
conviction.2 3 The Rule required those capital sentencing aggravating fac24
tors to be established as elements.

2.

Defining Sentencing Guidelines "Maximum" Sentences

The Rule also applies to provisions of law that purport merely to regulate the sentences imposed for offenses but that in fact impose legally
binding restrictions on the discretion of the sentencing judge. 25 The
Washington statutory scheme in Blakely contained entirely separate provisions for defining criminal offenses on the one hand, and guidelines for
regulating the sentences imposed upon convictions on the other.2 6 Although the offense provisions included a maximum penalty of ten years'
imprisonment for a class B felony kidnapping charge, the guidelines delimited a sentencing range of forty-nine to fifty-three months based on
the facts admitted in the guilty plea. 27 Upon the finding of additional
facts in a sentencing hearing pursuant to the guidelines, however, the

judge imposed a sentence of ninety months. 28 The Court in Blakely held
the enhanced sentence unconstitutional under the Rule because the legally binding range produced by the guidelines, not the ten years in the
offense provisions, was the relevant statutory maximum. 29 In Booker, the

23. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 592-93, 597.
24. See id. at 600-05, 609.
25. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 298-300 (2004).
26. See id. at 299.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 300.
29. See id. at 304. The scholarly reaction to Blakely's expansion of the Apprendi doctrine was immediate. See generally, Albert W. Alschuler, To Sever or Not to Sever? Why
Blakely Requires Action by Congress, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 11 (2004); Rachel E. Barkow,
The Devil You Know: FederalSentencing After Blakely, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 312 (2004);
Douglas A. Berman, The Roots and Realities of Blakely, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2005, at 5;
Douglas A. Berman, ConceptualizingBlakely, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 89 (2004); Douglas A.
Berman, Examining the Blakely Earthquake and Its Aftershocks, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 307
(2004); Stephanos Bibas, Blakely's Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 333 (2004);
Frank 0. Bowman III, Function over Formalism: A ProvisionalTheory of the Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment,17 FED. SENT'G REP. 1 (2004); Frank 0. Bowman III,
Train Wreck? Or Can the FederalSentencing System Be Saved?, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217
(2004); Steven L. Chanenson, Hoist with Their Own Petard?, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 20
(2004); Timothy Cone, Double Jeopardy Post-Blakely, 41 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1373 (2004);
James Felman, How Should the Congress Respond if the Supreme Court Strikes Down the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 97 (2004); Phil Fortino, A PostBlakely Era or a Post-Blakely Error?, 38 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (2004); Jackie
Gardina, Compromising Liberty: A Structural Critique of the Sentencing Guidelines, 38 U.
MicH. J.L. REFORM 345 (2005); Michael Goldsmith, Reconsidering the Constitutionality of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely: A Former Commissioner's Perspective,
2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 935; Mark D. Harris, Blakely's Unfinished Business, 17 FED. SENT'G
REP. 83 (2004); Jason Hernandez, Blakely's Potential,38 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 19
(2004); Nancy King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENT'G, REP. 316 (2004);
Larry Kupers, Proposalfor a Viable Federal Sentencing Scheme in the Wake of Blakely v.
Washington, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 28 (2004); Eric Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury
Sentencing: Misgivings About Apprendi, 82 N.C. L. REV. 621 (2004); Rory K. Little &
Teresa Chen, The Lost History of Apprendi and the Blakely Petitionfor Rehearing, 17 FED.
SENT'G REP. 69 (2004); Jane L. McClellan & Jon M. Sands, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the
Guidelines: Blakely's Possible Implicationsfor the "Safety Valve", 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 40

2007]

The ConstitutionalLaw of Wagging

Court applied the Rule in the same manner to the offense provisions of
the United States Code and the sentencing regulations in the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. 30 Although the offense statute included a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for the narcotics possession charge, the
Guidelines delimited a sentencing range of 210-262 months based on the
quantity of crack cocaine reflected in the jury's verdict. 3 1 Upon the finding of additional facts at a sentencing hearing pursuant to the Guidelines,
however, the judge imposed a sentence of 360 months.32 Again the Court
held the enhanced sentence unconstitutional because the Guidelines'
range applicable to the offense elements established in the jury verdict
33
alone was the relevant statutory maximum.
(2004); Richard E. Myers II, Restoring the Peers in the "Bulwark": Blakely v. Washington
and the Court's Jury Project, 83 N.C. L. REv. 1383 (2005); Mark Osler, The Blakely Problem and the 3x Solution, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 344 (2004); Aaron Rappaport, What the
Supreme Court Should Do: Save Sentencing Reform, Gut the Guidelines, 17 FED. SENT'G
REP. 46 (2004); Peter B. Rutledge, Apprendi, Blakely, and Federalism, 50 S.D. L. REV. 427
(2005); Peter B. Rutledge, Apprendi and Federalism, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 100 (2004);
Jeffrey Standen, The New Importance of Maximum Penalties, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 575
(2005); Symposium, The Future of American Sentencing: A National Roundtable on
Blakely, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 115 (2004); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Implementing Blakely,
17 FED. SENT'G REP. 106 (2004); Robert Weisberg, Excerpts from "The Future of American
Sentencing: A National Roundtable on Blakely", 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619 (2005).
30. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27, 231-35 (2005).
31. See id. at 227, 235.
32. See id. In the consolidated companion case, United States v. Fanfan, the sentencing
findings increased the Guidelines range from 63-78 months to 188-235 months. See id. at
228.
33. See id. at 231-35, 243-44. The scholarly reaction to Booker was even more impressive in its scope and depth. In addition to articles cited in other footnotes, see Ronald J.
Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195 (2005); Robert Anello & Jodi
Mishkin Peikin, Evolving Roles in Federal Sentencing: The Post Booker/Fanfan World, 2005
FED. CTs. L. REV. 9 (2005); Bruce A. Antkowiak, JudicialNullification, 38 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 545 (2005); Rachel E. Barkow, Our Federal System of Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV.
119 (2005); Douglas A. Berman, Assessing Federal Sentencing After Booker, 17 FED.
SENT'G REP. 291 (2005); Douglas Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender
Characteristics, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277 (2005); Douglas A. Berman, Foreword: Beyond
Blakely and Booker: Pondering Modern Sentencing Process, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653 (2005); Douglas A. Berman, Perspectives and Principlesfor a Post-Booker World,
17 FED. SENT'G REP. 231 (2005); Douglas A. Berman, Perspectives on Booker's Potential,
18 FED. SENT'G REP. 79 (2005); Douglas Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines
in the FederalSystem, 43 Hous. L. REV. 341 (2006); Stephanos Bibas, The Blakely Earthquake Exposes the Procedure/SubstanceFault Line, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 258 (2005); Frank
0. Bowman III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposalfor Reconfiguring FederalSentencing After
Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149 (2005); Frank 0. Bowman III, The Year of Jubilee...
Or Maybe Not: Some PreliminaryObservations About the Operation of the FederalSentencing System After Booker, 43 Hous. L. REV. 279 (2006); Rosemary T. Cakmis, The Role of
the FederalSentencing Guidelinesin the Wake of United States v. Booker and United States
v. Fanfan, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1131 (2005); James G. Carr, Some Thoughts on Sentencing
Post-Booker, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 295 (2005); Timothy Cone, Booker Waivers in Plea
Agreements: Are They Permissible?, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 94 (2005); Margareth Etienne,
Into the Briar Patch?:Power Shifts Between Prosecutionand Defense After United States v.
Booker, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 741 (2005); Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV. 569 (2005); Morris B. Hoffman, Booker, Pragmatism,
and the Moral Jury, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 455 (2005); Kyron Huigens, Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1048 (2005); Kim Hunt & Michael Connelly, Advisory
Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 233 (2005); Sandra D. Jordan,
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Defining Sentencing Within These "Maximum" Sentences

The Rule does not deem all sentencing factors unconstitutional, however. Findings of fact that are made in addition to the elements of the
offense are permissible when used to determine the appropriate sentence
to be imposed on the convicted offender within the maximum sentence
defined by application of the Rule. 34 For example, the federal firearms
possession statute in Harrisprovided for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment based on the elements of the offense established in the guilty
verdict alone. 35 At sentencing the judge found that the defendant had
brandished the gun, rather than simply possessed it, and therefore imposed a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of seven years, rather
than five. 36 This sentence did not violate the Rule because the sentencing
factor did not alter the relevant statutory maximum (life), but only determined the appropriate sentence within that maximum (increase from five
to seven years). 37 In Booker, Justice Stevens suggested a similar example,
in which the elements of the offense produced a Guidelines sentencing
range of 130-162 months and the finding of an additional fact at sentencing increased the Guidelines range to 151-188 months. 38 Under the Rule,
that finding of fact would permit imposition of a sentence of between 151
and 162 months; that is, it constitutionally could authorize the increased
minimum sentence from 130 to 151 months (as in Harris)but not an increase above the Apprendi maximum sentence of 162 months (as in
39

Booker).

Have We Come Full Circle? JudicialSentencing Discretion Restored in Booker and Fanfan,
33 PEPP. L. REV. 615 (2006); Nancy J. King, Reasonableness Review After Booker, 43
Hous. L. REV. 325 (2006); Michael Marcus, Booker, Blakely, and the Future of Sentencing,
17 FED. SENT'G REP. 243 (2005); Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U.
L. REV. 665 (2006); Michael M. O'Hear, The Duty to Avoid Disparity:Implementing 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) After Booker, 37 McGEORGE L. REV. 627 (2006); Michael M. O'Hear,
Is Restorative Justice Consistent with Sentencing Uniformity?, 89 MARO. L. REV. 305 (2005);
Michael O'Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 249 (2005); Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Decisionmakerto the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124 (2005); Quin M. Sorenson, The Illegality of
Resentencing, 44 Duo. L. REV. 211 (2006); Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for
Sentencing Reform: Establishing A Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 217 (2005); Sandra Guerra Thompson, The Booker Project:Introduction,43 Hous. L.
REV. 269 (2006); Melanie Wilson, In Booker's Shadow: Restitution Forces a Second Debate
on Honesty in Sentencing, 39 IND. L. REV. 379 (2006); Ronald F. Wright, Incremental and
Incendiary Rhetoric in Sentencing After Blakely and Booker, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 461 (2006); Ronald F. Wright, The Power of Bureaucracyin the Response to Blakely
and Booker, 43 Hous. L. REV. 389 (2006); Philip Zane, Booker Unbound, 17 FED. SENT'G
REP. 263 (2005); John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing Following
Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines (Fordham Law Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 102), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=869977.
34. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 560-69 (2002).
35. See Harris,536 U.S. at 550-51 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)); id. at 574, 575-76
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that statute provides maximum penalty of life imprisonment). Harris was convicted in a bench trial. See id. at 551.
36. See id. at 550-52.
37. See id. at 557-68.
38. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 278-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
39. See id.
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Moreover, the Court also has emphasized that the Rule is inapplicable
to findings of fact made by judges under indeterminate sentencing
schemes, in which the selection of the appropriate sentence is made not
pursuant to positive law sentencing factors but rather in the judge's own
0
exercise of discretion. 4
4. Conclusions About Sentencing Factfinding Under the Rule
The Rule places great emphasis on the factual findings necessary for
determining the maximum punishment to which the convicted offender is
exposed. Once that maximum sentence is established by the determination of offense-element facts in a jury verdict or guilty plea, however, the
Rule does not similarly restrict the use of additional factual findings in
determining the exact amount of punishment to be imposed. Sentencing
factfinding is permissible so long as it occurs within the statutory range
provided for the offense and within the applicable sentencing guidelines
range, if any, for the offense-element facts. Sentencing factfinding is unconstitutional only if it produces a sentence that exceeds the statutory
range provided for the offense or exceeds the applicable sentencing
guidelines range, if any, for the offense-element facts. The only question
to be asked in applying the Rule to sentencing factfinding is whether the
effect of the given factual determination is to alter the "statutory maximum" penalty.
These three aspects of applying the Rule are summarized in the following charts.
CHART 1: THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
SENTENCING: STATUTORY RANGES
Penalty
Range
5-10 yrs.

Additional Fact(s)
motive (hate crime)

Sentence
Imposed
12 yrs.

Result
41
unconstitutional

possession of firearm
in connection with
drug offense

5 yrs. - life

brandishing

7 yrs.

constitutional

carjacking

up to 15 yrs.

victim injury

25 yrs.

unconstitutional

bank robbery

up to 20 yrs.

victim injury

15 yrs.

constitutional 4 4

Offense of Conviction
unlawful firearm discharge

42

43

40. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (stating that "[w]e have never doubted the authority of
a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range");
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000).
41. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491-92.
42. See Harris,536 U.S. at 556-68.
43. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 231-32 & n.1 (1999).
44. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113 (West 2006); cf. Harris, 536 U.S. at 566
(The judge may select any sentence within the range, based on facts not
alleged in the indictment or proved to the jury even if those facts are
specified by the legislature, and even if they persuade the judge to choose a
much higher sentence than he or she otherwise would have imposed.).
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CHART 2: THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
SENTENCING: GUIDELINES RANGES
Offense of
Conviction
crack distribution
cocaine distribution
kidnapping
narcotics

Statutory
Range

Guidelines
Range

Additional
Fact(s)
10 yrs. - life 210-262 mos. drug quantity &
obstruction of
justice
drug quantity &
63-78 mos.
5-40 yrs.
leadership role
deliberate cruup to 10 yrs. 49-53 mos.
elty
up to 20 yrs. 130-162 mos. firearm possession

Sentence
Imposed
360 mos.

Result
45
unconstitutional

188 mos.

unconstitutional

90 mos.

unconstitutional

151 mos.

constitutional

46

47

48

Again, it must be emphasized that the Rule does not require that
sentences imposed on convicted offenders be based only on the facts determined beyond a reasonable doubt in a jury trial or admitted in a guilty
plea, nor does the Rule invalidate all sentencing factfinding. Rather, the
Rule is concerned with establishing the outer limit on the potential sentence-the "statutory maximum" as defined by the Rule-while leaving
considerable leeway for the consideration of additional facts within that
limit.
Consequently, the Rule as defined and applied by the Court is a highly
formalistic principle that takes no consideration of the actual quantitative
effect of the sentencing factfinding upon the offender's sentence. For example, in Apprendi the sentencing finding of a hate-crime motive added
49
at least two years to the otherwise applicable weapons-offense sentence;
in Harris the sentencing finding of firearm brandishing added two years
to the otherwise applicable weapons-offense sentence. 50 In Blakely, the
sentencing finding of deliberate cruelty toward the crime victim added
roughly three years to the otherwise applicable kidnapping sentence. 51
Justice Stevens' dissent in Booker delineated a sentencing finding of firearm possession that added nearly two years to an otherwise applicable
narcotics-offense sentence. 52 Yet the sentences in Apprendi and Blakely
45. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 226, 235 (defendant Booker).
46. See id. at 228 (defendant Fanfan).
47. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-05.
48. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 278-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
49. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468. The hate crime finding resulted in a sentence of twelve
years; without that finding the range was five to ten years. Id.
50. Harris, 536 U.S. at 550-52. The brandishing finding resulted in a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years; without that finding the mandatory minimum sentence was
five years. Id.
51. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 297-301. The deliberate cruelty finding resulted in a Guidelines sentence of ninety months; without that finding the range was forty-nine to fifty-three
months. Id. at 300.
52. Booker, 543 U.S. at 278-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The firearm possession finding
resulted in a minimum Guidelines sentence 151 months (from a range of 151-188 months);
without that finding the minimum Guidelines sentence was 130 months (from a range of
130-162 months). Id.
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were held unconstitutional, while the sentences in Harrisand the Booker
dissent's hypothetical were not. 53 Similarly, in Booker, the sentencing
finding of additional quantities of crack cocaine added over eight years to
the otherwise applicable narcotics-offense sentence; 54 in an indeterminate
sentencing regime a judge's exercise of discretion could add eight years to
5 5 Yet the sentence in Booker is unconstituan offender's sentence as well.
56
tional and the other is not.
These consequences produced by the Rule are arbitrary and illogical.
The Rule's exclusive emphasis on the relevant "statutory maximum" obscures the inconsistencies created by its operation: two findings of fact
may result in indistinguishable actual effects, yet under the Rule one
could be unconstitutional and the other constitutional.
C.

THE ABSURD FORMALISMS OF THE RULE

This is not to suggest that all formalistic requirements are inappropriate in the constitutional law of sentencing. In a prior article, Structuring
Sentencing, I argued that the Court correctly adopted the initial version
of the Rule-as defined in Apprendi and Harris-asa means of preserving the significance of a verdict of guilt on a charged offense. 57 A criminal
prosecution involves a statutory offense, a prosecutorial charge, and a
58
guilty verdict on the elements of the offense at trial or in a guilty plea.
Each stage in this process-offense definition, charging decision, and verdict determination-narrows the scope of possible punishments to which
the defendant is exposed at sentencing for the offense of conviction
thereby established. 59 For example, the ruling in Apprendi was justified
because the elements of the offense of conviction authorized a sentence
of five to ten years, yet a sentence of twelve years was imposed. 60 In
Harris,by contrast, the elements of the offense of conviction authorized a
61
sentence of life, while a far lesser sentence of seven years was imposed.
It is true that in each case a sentencing finding increased the otherwise
applicable sentence by two years. 62 Nevertheless, in Apprendi the government had sought to obtain an enhanced sentence greater than that au53. Id. at 278-80 (Stevens J., dissenting); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301-05; Harris, 536 U.S.
456-68; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491-92.
54. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226, 235-36. The additional drug quantity finding resulted in a
sentence of 360 months; without that finding the Guidelines range was 210-262 months. Id.
at 235.
55. For example, the federal bank robbery offense carries a maximum penalty of
twenty years' imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113(a) (West 2006). Prior to the adoption
of the Guidelines, judges could have found facts in the course of determining any sentence
within that range, such as an increase from seven to fifteen years. See Booker, 543 U.S. at
235.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Booker, 543 U.S. at 227-31.
Priester, supra note 8, at 885-909.
id. at 891-95.
id.
id. at 896-902.
id. at 902-06.
id. at 906-07.
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thorized by a conviction for a second-degree felony, while in Harris the
enhanced sentence sought by the government already had been authorized by the firearms possession conviction. 6 3 Thus, the Apprendi-Harris
doctrine vindicates the Constitution's requirement that the restrictions of
the offense of conviction be respected and that the sentence imposed be
no greater than that authorized by the guilty verdict. 64
After Blakely and Booker, however, the formalism of the Rule has
been expanded far beyond this limited and necessary role of preserving
the integrity of the guilty verdict on the offense of conviction. Instead, the
Rule now produces illogical, inconsistent, and arbitrary outcomes. Unlike
the Apprendi-Harrisformalism, which ensures the integrity of the offense
of conviction, the Blakely-Booker formalism has no doctrinal or logical
justification that can withstand such radical inconsistencies.
The operation of the Rule exalts form over substance to uphold and
invalidate functionally identical sentencing determinations. This inconsistent treatment can occur in two ways. In one situation, the same finding
of fact with the same quantitative effect on the sentence is given differential treatment in two otherwise-indistinguishable cases in different states
based solely on the narrow formalism. The other scenario involves intrajurisdictional inconsistencies, when the same finding of fact with the same
quantitative effect on the sentence is given differential treatment in two
cases in the same state with determinate sentencing guidelines.
The first situation is far more common, and simple to describe. Consider two jurisdictions having identical armed robbery offenses with the
same offense elements and the same statutory maximum penalty-say, up
to ten years' imprisonment-in that offense statute. State A has discretionary judicial sentencing, leaving it entirely to the judgment of the trial
court what sentence to impose within that statutory ceiling. State B has a
system of determinate sentencing guidelines which involve not only calculation of a baseline punishment but also consideration of additional aggravating and mitigating facts.
Now consider the application of the Rule to the sentences imposed on
otherwise identical offenders in the two states. The sentencing judge in
State A might determine that, in addition to the offense elements of
armed robbery, the defendant discharged his firearm in a manner that
endangered the life of his victim. Accordingly, the judge might exercise
his discretion to increase the sentence relative to the punishment he
would have imposed without that finding-say, from four years to six
years. Similarly, the sentencing judge in State B might make the same
factual determinations of firearm discharge and endangerment. Rather
than exercising discretion, however, he applies the determinate sentencing provisions of the guidelines and increases the sentence-say, from a
baseline of four years to an enhanced sentence of six years.
63. See id. at 906-08.
64. See id. at 908-09, 928-34.
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Thus, the cases in State A and State B are identical factually and in the
actual quantitative effect of sentencing factfinding on the offenders'
sentences. Yet the sentence in State A is constitutional but the sentence
in State B is not. The only distinction is the formalistic analysis mandated
by the Rule.
Again, it must be emphasized that the differences between the sentencing findings in State A and State B are not differences of substance, but
rather differences of form. In each situation a finding of fact established
as a sentencing factor increases the sentence above what otherwise would
have been imposed. Whether that increase is constitutionally permissible
under the Rule is not determined, for example, by the absolute length of
the increase or the relative increase to the offender's sentence. Instead,
the permissibility of the increase depends entirely on whether the finding
implicates the "statutory maximum" defined by the Rule. In many situations, however, that definition has little relation to the nature of the sentencing process.
This problem is exacerbated in the second scenario, when the Rule produces intra-jurisdictional inconsistencies. Consider a hypothetical involving two defendants convicted in State B, which has determinate
sentencing guidelines. Defendants X and Y both plead guilty to felony
narcotics distribution. The only difference in their offense elements is that
X distributed two and one-half kilograms of cocaine while Y distributed
three and one-half kilograms, producing baseline sentencing ranges of
110-137 months for X and 130-162 months for Y. At sentencing, the respective judges each make the additional finding that X and Y possessed
firearms during the commission of their offenses and add fifteen months
to the midline sentence of the applicable guidelines range. Based on this
identical sentencing fact with identical quantitative effect, X is sentenced
to 139 months and Y to 161 months. Except for narrowly divergent drugquantity admissions, the cases are otherwise identical. Yet under the Rule
the sentence imposed on X is unconstitutional and the sentence imposed
5
on Y is not.

6

Even within a single jurisdiction using a determinate sentencing regime, therefore, it is possible for the Rule to produce opposing outcomes
in functionally identical cases. The same finding of fact can result in the
same quantitative increase in two defendants' sentences, yet one enhancement is permissible and the other is not based solely on whether the
sentence imposed after the increase exceeds or falls within the applicable
guidelines sentencing ranges. Worse still, this disparity can exist, as in the
65. This example is a modified version of the hypothetical suggested by Justice Stevens
in Booker. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines the base offense levels are 26 for X and 28 for Y. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(4)-(5) (2006). The addition of the firearm possession factor
does not mandate an exact fifteen-month increase; rather, two offense levels are added. See
id. § 2D1.1(b)(1). With a criminal history category of V, the sentencing ranges are 110-137
months and 130-162 months for X; the ranges are 130-162 months and 151-188 months for
Y. See id. Sentencing Table.
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example of Defendants X and Y, even with quite small differences in the
underlying offense elements.
Thus, the problem with the Rule is not merely that it treats functionally
identical sentencing factfinding differently as between discretionary and
determinate sentencing regimes, but also that its operation can result in
treating functionally identical sentencing factfinding differently even
within determinate sentencing regimes. Identical facts producing identical
quantitative punishment outcomes have divergent constitutionality depending exclusively upon form, not substance.
Taken together, these two situations illustrate the absurd formalism of
the Rule. Sentencing factfinding in discretionary sentencing regimes is
constitutional, even when it is functionally identical to indistinguishable
findings of fact deemed unconstitutional when they occur in determinate
sentencing regimes. That doctrinal result might make sense if the Rule
simply invalidated all sentencing factfinding in determinate regimes. But
of course that is not what it does. Sometimes sentencing factfinding in
determinate sentencing regimes is permissible under the Rule and sometimes it is not, and which of those is true in a given case has nothing at all
to do with the substantive merits of the sentence increase involved.
D.

WHAT'S THE JURY GOT TO

Do

WITH IT?

At this point one could be forgiven for wondering what happened to
the role of the jury in the operation of the Rule. What's the jury got to do
with it? Nothing.
Despite the Court's persistence in its analysis, the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury cannot explain the parameters of the new constitutional law of sentencing. The jury has not been given more power at trial;
it still adjudicates disputed facts and determines the presence or absence
beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the offense. Nor has the
jury been given more power at the sentencing hearing; Blakely and
Booker both continue to contemplate a procedure in which the jury's role
concludes at trial and the sentencing hearing is a separate proceeding
conducted before a judge.
This is not to say that the trial jury is without any power that has implications for sentencing, because of course the jury verdict establishing the
elements of the offense of conviction serves a traditional separation-ofpowers, checks-and-balances function in a criminal proceeding. 66 If the
jury acquits, the defendant cannot be sentenced at all; if the jury convicts
of lesser charges, the ultimate sentence will be lower than if the jury had
convicted on the greater charges. 67 The jury stands between the accused
66. See Priester, supra note 8, at 895.
67. Opinions in the Apprendi line of cases sometimes have described one of the functions of the Rule as being to ensure the sanctity of acquittals 'on greater offenses when the
defendant is convicted of a lesser offense. See, e.g., Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04; Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 601-02 (2002); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring);
Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 740-41 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
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and the legislature, safeguarding the hallowed common law principle that
68
juries of citizens have the power (if not the right) to nullify unjust laws.
The jury also is interposed between the accused and the prosecutor, ensuring that the executive's allegations of criminal responsibility are adjudicated by a separate and independent entity.6 9 Finally, the jury's verdict
constrains the authority of the judge at the subsequent sentencing hearing, serving to protect the convicted offender from punishments not authorized by the laws and proof.70 In these ways, it is fair to say that by
adjudicating the offense elements of guilty verdicts, the jury does
exercise
71
some power with respect to the convicted offender's sentence.
But this exercise of power by the jury is not an exercise of sentencing
power; it is an exercise of trial power. Nothing in the Apprendi-Harris
and Blakely-Booker doctrines creates any direct, primary capacity for the
jury to impose punishment on the convicted offender. Instead the guilty
verdict's effects at sentencing are indirect and incidental consequences of
the jury's offense adjudication. The constraints imposed on the sentencing judge are secondary; they are simply derivative of the jury's primary
72
role of adjudicating guilt.
If the role of the jury cannot explain the Rule, then, something else
must be going on in the Apprendi line of cases. The reality is that the
Court's reliance on the jury trial clause of the Sixth Amendment is a pretext to conceal a more controversial objective.
The true function played by the Rule is not protecting the jury's province in a criminal case, but rather protecting sentencing judge's authority
to pass judgment on individual offenders against legislative attempts to
constrain that discretion. The operation of the Rule reduces legislative
and prosecutorial power, but it does not shift that power to the trial
jury-it shifts that power to the sentencing judge. By requiring facts mandating an outer limit on sentencing discretion to be proven as an element
of the offense, the Rule reduces legislative power relative to the sentenc(Petitioner Monge was convicted of the crime of using a minor to sell marijuana, which carries a maximum possible sentence of seven years in prison
under California law. He was later sentenced to eleven years in prison, however, on the basis of several additional facts that California and the Court
have chosen to label 'sentence enhancement allegations.' However California chooses to divide and label its criminal code, I believe that for federal
constitutional purposes those extra four years are attributable to conviction
of a new crime. Monge was functionally acquitted of that crime when the
California Court of Appeal held that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain the trial court's 'enhancement' findings.).
68. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243-48 (1999) (emphasizing significance
of historical practice of jury nullification as justification for the Rule); see also Darryl K.
Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1997); Nancy J.
King, Silencing Jury Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 433 (1998); Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253 (1996).

69.
70.
71.
72.

See
See
See
See

Priester, supra note 8, at 893-96, 899-900.
id. at 894-95, 898-900.
id. at 896-97, 889-90.
id. at 896-909.
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ing judge. 73 The legislature can no longer use sentencing guidelines or
other binding provisions of law to limit the sentencing authority of
judges; only offense elements determined by juries may do that. Similarly,
the Rule reduces the relative power of prosecutors, because any binding
sentencing enhancements they seek to rely on must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury at trial, not merely to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing. The beneficiary of this decrease in
legislative and prosecutorial power is not the jury, however, but the sentencing judge. If legislatures are willing to entrust judges with wide sentencing discretion, then the Rule rarely will come into play. On the other
hand, if legislatures seek to restrict judicial sentencing discretion within
narrow limits, then the Rule imposes significant constraints on such sentencing reform measures.
Addressing the conceptual confusion caused by the Court's persistence
in analyzing the Rule in terms of jury power after Blakely and Booker
even though doing so makes no sense, Professor Berman said it best:
To make better conceptual sense of [the Rule], we must.., view [it]
not in terms of the distinctive role and importance of juries and a
traditional vision of a criminal trial, but rather in terms of the distinctive role and importance of judges and a traditional vision of sentencing. In other words, a resolution to [the] conceptual conundrum
can be found if the [Rule] is understood to be not really about vindicating the role of juries and the meaning of the Sixth Amendment's
jury trial right, but rather about vindicating the role of judges....
[Tihough perhaps some Justices do love jury trial rights, all the Justices love judges and thus seem comfortable allowing sentencing
judges to consider extra-verdict
facts when exercising reasoned judg74
ment at sentencing.
This explanation successfully reconciles the Court's holdings and their
consequences. In the guise of preserving the role of the jury, the Court in
fact has expanded judicial power.
III.

THE THREE STAGES OF A SENTENCING DECISION:
SPECIFYING FUNCTION AND NATURE

Once a conviction is obtained, the offender will be sentenced. Much
like the Rule, the function of a sentencing proceeding is deceptively simple to describe: everyone agrees that the task performed at sentencing is
determining the precise punishment to be imposed. But just like the Rule,
the implementation of that basic idea is far from easy.
Punishment determinations must be made-but by whom, how, and
under what legal regime will they occur? What is the relative power of
judges and legislatures? Will there be additional factfinding by juries or
73.

See also Berman, supra note 8, at 407-10; Ian Weinstein, The Revenge of Mullaney

v. Wilbur: U.S v. Booker and the Reassertion of Judicial Limits on Legislative Power to
Define Crimes, 84 OR. L. REV. 393 (2005).

74. Berman, supra note 8, at 410.
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judges? Will judicial factfinding be pursuant to discretion, guidelines, or
mandatory sentencing? What power will judges possess to assess the
moral value of the facts found? Analysis of the function and nature of a
sentencing decision too often is muddled by evaluating sentencing as
though it were a unitary exercise-that is, by a failure to specify clearly
which of these questions is being addressed.
The functional operation of sentencing can be broken down into three
separate stages. Each. stage has a different nature, implicating different
constitutional and policy interests. Each of the three stages presents its
own controversies and doctrinal conundrums. Analyzing the function and
nature of sentencing in terms of this tripartite framework clarifies the
true stakes in the controversies over which institution will wield what
kind of sentencing power.
The first stage of a sentencing decision is the adjudication of the factual
elements of the defendant's offense of conviction. That is, what facts are
necessary to establish the defendant's guilt of the charged offense?
The second stage is the adjudication of additional findings of fact that
are legally relevant to the determination of the appropriate punishment
for the offender. That is, what facts above and beyond those offense elements will be established before deciding upon the precise sentence for
the given offender?
The third stage is the determination of legal and moral value of the
offense element facts and additional punishment facts. That is, after this
array of offense elements and punishment facts has been established,
what is the precise penalty that should be imposed on the offender?
Analyzing each stage separately reveals the underlying disputes and
conflicts over sentencing laws and sentencing reform in a more transparent manner. The analysis also isolates certain aspects of the controversy
to a single stage, which helps to more fully explain the different rationales
applicable in the other stages. In the end, the tripartite analytical framework reveals that beneath the superficial camouflage of its Sixth Amendment analysis, the Court in fact has decreed as constitutional law a
specific, contestable, and highly controversial normative vision of the nature of criminal sentencing.
A.

CONTROVERSIES AT THE FIRST STAGE

The decision to be made in the first stage is one of fact. Offenses are
defined by statutes that prescribe the particular factual conditions-actus
reus and mens rea-that constitute the crime. For example, aggravated
carjacking might consist of (i) taking (ii) a motor vehicle (iii) from another person (iv) by force or threat (v) while possessing a firearm (vi)
resulting in serious bodily injury.7 5 A narcotics offense might consist of (i)
75. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988 Supp. V) ("Whoever, possessing a firearm ...,
takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation . . .shall . . .if serious bodily injury . . . results . . .be fined under this title or
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knowingly (ii) possessing (iii) with intent to distribute (iv) cocaine (v) of a
quantity 500 grams or more and less than five kilograms. 76 The function
of the first stage is the adjudication of whether these delineated facts are
present or absent in the given defendant's case.
At the first stage there is no controversy over the process. Everyone
agrees that the Constitution mandates that offense elements be established either in a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt by a trial jury or
through admission in a guilty plea by the defendant. In that limited sense,
then, the first stage might seem not to involve not sentencing at all, but
only trial and conviction. 77 The determination of offense elements, however, is a necessary predicate step in the sentencing process because the
adjudication of offense elements has substantial implications for the
78
range of penalties available in the other two stages.
The controversies at the first stage concern substance: how and to what
extent the established offense elements create limits on the subsequent
stages. Some argue that the offense elements place narrow limits on the
ultimate sentence. Others argue for much more substantial limitations.
There are, in fact, four different positions on the relationship between the
offense elements and the possible scope of the ultimate punishment.
1.

Pure Positivism: the Apprendi Dissent Position

Since the Apprendi line of cases began, a group of four justices consistently has advocated for a purely positivist relationship between the offense of conviction and the scope of the ultimate sentence. 79 According to
this position, the only constraint placed on the ultimate sentence by the
offense of conviction is whatever the statutes of the given jurisdiction
happen to provide. 80 Moreover, the relevant statutes for consideration
are not only the statute that specifically delineates the factual elements of
the charged offense, but also any other statutes that create penalty provisions applicable to the sentencing of a person convicted for the charged
imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both."), construed in Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227 (1999).
76. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a) - (b)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2006); cf. United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 228 (2006) (conspiracy to commit such violation in defendant Fanfan's case).
77. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
78. For this reason, Professor Cahill argues that trial juries should be instructed not
only on the conviction/acquittal consequences of the charged crime's offense elements "but
also as to the offense grades and overall sentencing ranges that correspond" to those elements. Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Decisions at Conviction: Recognizing the Jury as
Fault-Finder,2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91, 92. Under this proposal, juries making first stage
adjudications would be expressly informed of the second and third stage consequences of
their findings. See id. at 95-116, 136-147.
79. See Priester, supra note 8, at 872 & n.49; Priester, ConstitutionalFormalism, supra
note 18, at 292-96. This position has some support in the scholarly commentary, as well. See
Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding,supra note 18, at 1153-56.
80. See Preister, ConstitutionalFormalism, supra note 18, at 292; see also Booker, 543
U.S. at 327-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Blakely, 542 U.S. 320-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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offense. 8 1 For example, in Apprendi the facts established as elements of
the offense in the defendant's guilty plea were sufficient to establish a
second-degree felony weapons offense with an authorized punishment of
five to ten years' imprisonment. 82 A separate statute provided that if the
sentencing judge determined by a preponderance of the evidence that a
racially biased hate-crime motive was involved, the sentence could be enhanced to ten to twenty years' imprisonment (a range equivalent to a
first-degree felony).83 The four dissenters argued that the sentence of
twelve years imposed on the defendant was authorized by the positive
law-and therefore was constitutional. 84 The group applied this same
analysis to the sentencing laws and guidelines at issue in Blakely and
85
Booker.
Interestingly, two members of the group asserting this position were
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor. 86 Should Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito align themselves with a different argument, the
support on the Court for the positivist position could shrink to Justices
87
Breyer and Kennedy.
Under this positivist position, therefore, the only punishment that
would be unconstitutional by reference to the offense elements would be
one that was truly ultra vires-a judgment imposing a sentence authorized neither by the terms of the statute creating the offense of conviction
nor by any other statute whose provisions are applicable to the punishment of that offense. Standing alone, the facts established as elements of
81. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 552-54 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
82. See id. at 468-69 (describing operation of N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-4(a), 2C:436(a)(2) (West 1995)).
83. See id. (describing operation of N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:44-3(e), 2C:43-7(a)(3)).
84. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 552-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Priester, supra note 8,
at 897. These justices have conceded the theoretical possibility that the sentencing effect
authorized by statute might be so outrageously disconnected to the offense of conviction as
to violate the fundamental fairness guarantee of the Due Process Clause, although in their
view none of the statutes presented in the Apprendi line of cases has been close to implicating this proscription. See Priester, Sentenced, supra note 18, at 263-66 (describing multiprong factors analysis for fundamental fairness applied by these justices in cases prior to
Jones); Priester, Constitutional Formalism, supra note 18, at 292-94 (same after Jones and
Apprendi); Priester, supra note 8, at 872 & nn.48-49, 56; id. at 876 & nn.77-79; id. at 884 &
n.120 (same after Harris and Ring); see also Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306
(Those who would reject Apprendi are resigned to one of two alternatives.
The first is that the jury need only find whatever facts the legislature chooses
to label elements of the crime, and that those it labels sentencing factors-no
matter how much they may increase the punishment-may be found by the
judge ....
The second alternative is that legislatures may establish legally
essential sentencing factors within limits-limits crossed when, perhaps, the
sentencing factor is a "tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.").
85. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 326-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing and describing prior
dissenting opinions); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 323-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 327-28
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2552 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523.
87. Justices Kennedy and Breyer have reaffirmed their acceptance of the positivist
position in the most recent decisions. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 331-33 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 327-28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 328-29 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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the offense create no constitutionally significant limitation on the ultimate sentence.
2.

Statutory Mandatory Maximums: The Apprendi-Harris Position

As described above, the original incarnation of the Apprendi principle
declared that the factual findings established as elements of the offense of
conviction create a narrow constitutional constraint upon the ultimate
sentence to be imposed on the offender. 88 In determining the constitutionally significant maximum punishment, the only statute to be considered is the provision that delineates the elements of the offense of
conviction, and the only facts that may be considered in applying that
statute to the defendant are those established in a jury verdict or guilty
plea. 89 In Apprendi, this meant that the defendant's sentence of twelve
years was unconstitutional because the established offense elements of
the weapons crime only authorized a ten year maximum, and the separate
statute authorizing the enhanced punishment involved only a sentencing
factor. 90 In Harris,the principle was further clarified and held to extend
only to determining the maximum punishment authorized by the offense
elements, not the minimum authorized punishment. 9 1
In Structuring Sentencing, I argued that the constitutional doctrine
ought to be limited to this Apprendi-Harrisprinciple. The purpose served
by the doctrine is to ensure the significance of the offense of conviction. 92
The legislature's offense definitions, prosecutor's charges, and jury's verdict each have a role to play in authorizing and delimiting the scope of
the ultimate punishment to be imposed on a convicted offender. 93 To allow discretionary factfinding by sentencing judges or positive-law sentencing factors to enhance a sentence beyond the maximum authorized
by the charged offense for which the defendant was convicted would destroy the constitutional structure of criminal procedure. 94 On the other
hand, permitting discretionary factfinding by sentencing judges or positive-law sentencing factors to produce an increase in the defendant's sentence while remaining beneath that Apprendi-Harrismaximum-such as
in Harris,where the finding of brandishing resulted in an increase in the
mandatory minimum penalty from five years to seven years while not
altering the available maximum punishment of life imprisomnent 95-is
entirely consistent with the constitutional structure of criminal
procedure. 96
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
See Priester, supra note 8, at 873-76.
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69.
See Harris, 536 U.S. at 565; Priester, supra note 8, at 879-81.
Priester, supra note 8, at 891-909.
See id. at 891-95.
See id. at 896-902.
See Harris, 536 U.S. at 550-51, 554 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2002)).
See Priester, supra note 8, at 902-09.
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Under this Apprendi-Harrisposition, therefore, the only limit on sentencing created by the establishment of offense elements is a narrow one:
the determination of the maximum available punishment that ultimately
may be imposed on the offender. All other considerations, including statutory sentencing factors or other mandatory positive-law provisions, are
97
constitutional.
3.

Guidelines Mandatory Maximums: The Blakely-Booker Position

Also as described above, 98 a second iteration of the Apprendi principle
has extended the application of the requirement from statutory punishment ranges to sentencing guidelines punishment ranges. Like the Apprendi-Harrisposition, the only facts that may be considered in applying
the statutes and sentencing guidelines to the defendant are those established in a jury verdict or guilty plea. 99 In the Blakely-Booker position,
however, the constitutionally significant maximum punishment is determined not only by the statute that delineates the elements of the offense
of conviction, but also by the separate mandatory provisions of law that
constrain the authority of the sentencing judge to impose punishment.' 0 0
For example, even though the statute defining the narcotics possession
offense provided for a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, Booker
held that the defendant's sentence of 360 months was unconstitutional
because the quantity of crack cocaine reflected in the jury's verdict produced a Guidelines sentencing range of 210-262 months, and the additional facts justifying the enhanced sentence had been established as
sentencing factors at a sentencing hearing pursuant to the Guidelines, not
as offense elements. 10 1
It is worth emphasizing that to date the Court has restricted the
Blakely-Booker principle, like the Apprendi-Harris principle before it,
exclusively to the determination of the maximum punishment that ultimately may be imposed on the offender. Establishment of sentencing factors above and beyond the offense elements constitutionally may result in
increased punishment in two circumstances. One is when consideration of
those additional facts increases the minimum end of a mandatory guidelines range. 10 2 The other is when consideration of those additional facts
enhances the sentence but to an extent that nonetheless remains less than
97. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text. Professor Green agrees that the
Apprendi doctrine should apply only to the jury-authorized maximum penalty. See Craig
R. Green, Apprendi's Limits, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 1155, 1207-17 (2005). Contrary to my
position in Structuring Sentencing and this Article, he also would apply the doctrine to the

mandatory guidelines in Blakely because they are statutory. See id. Because the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines are non-statutory, however, he agrees that Apprendi should not
have been expanded any further, as it was Booker. See id.; see also Craig Green, Booker
and Fanfan: The Untimely Death (and Rebirth?) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 93
GEO. L.J. 395 (2005).
98. See Priester, supra note 8, at 928-35.
99. See Booker, 542 U.S. at 226-27, 235-36; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301-03, 313.
100. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 233-34; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04.
101. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 235.
102. In that regard, Blakely and Booker preserved the doctrinal result in Harris.
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10 3
the offense-elements-authorized maximum punishment.
Under this Blakely-Booker position, therefore, a broader constitutional
limit on the ultimate sentence is created by the establishment of offense
elements. It applies to any and all mandatory provisions of law, whether
in the statute defining the offense or in sentencing guidelines, that restrict
the maximum available punishment that ultimately may be imposed on
the offender. Consequently, significantly less capacity is available to use
of law to constrain and control judicial sentencing
mandatory1°provisions
discretion. 4

4. All Mandatory Effects: The Harris Dissent Position
Lurking in the background for nearly all of the development of the
Apprendi line of cases has been the issue of whether the constitutional
constraints created by establishment of the offense elements ought to apply not only to determination of the maximum punishment that ultimately may be imposed on the offender, but also to determination of the
minimum punishment as well. In Harris,a group of four Justices from the
Apprendi-Blakely-Booker majority argued that it should. 10 5 They conceded that the finding of fact involved-that the defendant had not simply possessed a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, but actually
had brandished it during the drug offense-did not increase the maxi10 6
mum available punishment (life imprisonment) the defendant faced.
Nonetheless, they maintained that because the mandatory minimum penalty had been increased from five years to seven years, the defendant's
sentence was unconstitutional unless the brandishing finding was established as an offense element. 10 7 Although there has been no occasion in
the Court's cases to state so directly, the implication seems clear that
these four Justices would apply this principle not only to statutory provisions, as in Apprendi-Harris,but also to mandatory sentencing guidelines
10 8
provisions, as in Blakely-Booker.
Under this mandatory-effects position, therefore, a quite broad constitutional limit results from the establishment of offense elements. Any and
103. See supra notes 38-39, 48, 65 and accompanying text (describing analysis in Justice
Stevens' dissenting opinion).
104. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 331-33 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 314
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
105. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 572-73, 575-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 575-76 (describing ranges of five to life and seven to life).
107. See id. at 575-79.
108. In his separate Apprendi opinion that served as the basis for the Harris dissent,
Justice Thomas suggested he would not distinguish between mandatory guidelines and statutes for purposes of applying his position. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 n.l (Thomas, J.,
concurring). In Booker he and the other three members of the Harrisdissent joined the
merits majority opinion by Justice Stevens, which relied on the same argument-and in
fact exactly the same citations to precedent-in applying the Apprendi principle to the
maximum-increasing provisions in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See Booker, 543
U.S. at 233-34. Accordingly, it seems clear that these Justices would extend their position's
statutory holding in Harris to mandatory guidelines minimum-increasing provisions as
well. See also Amy Baron-Evans & Anne E. Blanchard, The Occasion to Overrule Harris,
18 FED. SENT'G REP. 255 (2006).
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all mandatory provisions of law, whether offense statutes or sentencing
guidelines, that restrict in any way the scope of the available punishment
that ultimately may be imposed on the offender are governed by the constitutional principle. The only kind of additional factual findings that are
permissible at sentencing are those which have no binding effect on the
punishment determination being made by the judge, such as the consider10 9
Senation of advisory guidelines or the exercise of judicial discretion.
in a
authority
sentencing
judicial
to
limit
tencing reform that aspires
not
at
or
elements,
offense
through
mandatory way must be carried out
all.
5.

Aside: The Scalia Conundrum

It is worth noting that between the four-Justice Apprendi dissent bloc,
who maintain the purely positivist position, and the four-Justice Harris
dissent bloc, who assert the mandatory-effects position, stands Justice
Scalia-the sole Justice favoring the Blakely-Booker position. Unlike his
0°
four counterparts in the Apprendi-Blakely-Booker majority," Justice
Scalia voted in Harris to apply the constitutional principle only to determinations of the maximum authorized penalty and not to determinations
of the minimum end of the punishment range."' Despite being the dispositive vote for this doctrinal outcome, Justice Scalia abstained from his
112
Nevfrequent penchant for writing separately to explain his reasoning.
ertheless, his reasons may be inferred from other opinions in the Apprendi line of cases. 113 Although he believes the Apprendi doctrine, and
the later Blakely-Booker doctrine, is necessary to preserve the defendant's entitlement to a determination of his worst-case punishment scenario through a factual finding of offense elements, he considers any
sentence beneath that maximum-whether determined through judicial
109. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 233-34.
110. See id. at 225; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 314; Priester, supra note 8, at 884 & nn.121-24
(analyzing positions of justices prior to Blakely). Justice Scalia may have signaled in Apprendi itself that he ultimately would break with his erstwhile allies; he expressly declined
to join the parts of Justice Thomas's concurring opinion that asserted the same arguments
later made in the Harris dissent. See Harris,536 U.S. at 575-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499-523 (Thomas, J., concurring).
111. Harris, 536 U.S. at 576-77.
112. He joined Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 549.
113. Justice Scalia was the instigator and principal proponent of the Apprendi majority's originalist Sixth Amendment analysis. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring); Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227, 253 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring); Monge v. Cal., 524 U.S. 721,
740-41 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,
248-49 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The plurality opinion in Harris was written by Justice
Kennedy, but it does not rely on the non-originalist, fundamental fairness due process analysis he otherwise insisted should be applied. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 556-68; supra note 84
and accompanying text (describing and citing to fundamental fairness position followed by
Justice Kennedy and three other Justices). Instead, the Harris plurality opinion relies extensively upon the exact originalist arguments previously asserted by Justice Scalia, including citations to and quotations from those opinions. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 566, 558-59,
565, 568; see also Priester, supra note 8, at 884 & nn.123-24; Stephanos Bibas, Back from
the Brink, supra note 18 (analyzing Justice Scalia's position in Harris).
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discretion, mandatory statutory provisions, or mandatory sentencing
guidelines-to be a windfall to which the defendant has no constitutionally cognizable entitlement. 114 In Structuring Sentencing, I argued that
this mode of reasoning in fact better supports the Apprendi-Harrisposition, not Blakely-Booker.115 Justice Scalia, however, seems solidly encamped in the latter.
6. First-Stage Controversies: Conclusions
The controversy to be resolved in the first stage of a sentencing decision is only the initial part of the debate over the balance of power between legislatures and judges over which institution will wield how much
and what kind of sentencing power. That first issue is how and to what
extent the established offense elements create limits on the subsequent
stages. Those limits might be almost nonexistent, as in the positivist position, or relatively narrower or broader, as in the Apprendi-Harris and
Blakely-Booker positions, or extensive, as in the mandatory-effects position. Even apart from the subsequent stages, the decision of which position is adopted as the constitutional rule, therefore, has substantial
consequences for defining the nature of the sentencing proceeding as well
as the future of sentencing reform.
B.

CONTROVERSIES AT THE SECOND STAGE

The decision to be made in the second stage also is one of fact. The
determination of the appropriate punishment to be imposed on the convicted offender often depends on particular factual conditions independent of the offense elements. For example, although the offense elements
of the charged crime might proscribe carrying a firearm in relation to a
narcotics offense, the ultimate punishment imposed on a convicted offender might vary depending on whether the firearm was simply carried
114. Justice Scalia stated:
Of course indeterminate schemes involve judicial factfinding, in that a judge
(like a parole board) may implicitly rule on those facts he deems important
to the exercise of his sentencing discretion. But the facts do not pertain to
whether the defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence-and that makes all
the difference insofar as judicial impingement upon the traditional role of the
jury is concerned. In a system that says the judge may punish burglary with
10 to 40 years, every burglar knows he is risking 40 years in jail.
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 309 (Scalia, J., opinion for the Court).
I think it not unfair to tell a prospective felon that if he commits his contemplated crime he is exposing himself to a jail sentence of up to 30 years and
that if; upon conviction, he gets anything less than that he may thank the
mercy of a tenderhearted judge (just as he may thank the mercy of a tenderhearted parole commission if he is let out inordinately early, or the mercy of
a tenderhearted governor if his sentence is commuted).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Harris plurality relied on the same
argument: "Since sentencing ranges came into use, defendants have not been able to predict from the face of the indictment precisely what their sentence will be; the charged facts
have simply made them aware of the 'heaviest punishment' they face if convicted." See
Harris,536 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added).
115. See Priester, supra note 8, at 902-09.
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or instead was brandished or discharged.1 1 6 Similarly, although a seconddegree kidnapping offense might proscribe intentionally abducting another person without intent to hold for ransom or to injure, the ultimate
punishment imposed might take into account the fact that the perpetrator
was nonetheless deliberately cruel to his victim. 1 17 The function of the
second stage is the adjudication of whether these additional punishment
facts are present or absent in the given case.
Thus, at the second stage there is no controversy over substance. Everyone agrees that sometimes facts can exist which are legally and morally
irrelevant to guilt or innocence of the offense of conviction, but which
nevertheless are legally and morally relevant to the scope of punishment.
All other culpability factors being equal, the defendant with a rap sheet
of prior convictions would routinely be sentenced to a greater punishment than his counterpart with a previously clean record after both have
been convicted of joint participation in the same criminal incident.1 18 All
other culpability factors being equal, a conspirator who breaks with his
peers and cooperates with the government in the investigation or prosecution of others would routinely be sentenced to a lesser punishment than
the other conspirators. 1 9 Such facts are not adjudicated at trial where
they have nothing to contribute to the factual determinations at issue
there. Rather, they are adjudicated at sentencing where they can affect
the outcome.
The only dispute at the second stage involves process. Some favor additional factfinding by judges under a regime of judicial sentencing discretion, as was historically the predominant regime. Alternatively, judicial
factfinding can be subject to advisory or mandatory sentencing provisions, as has occurred more frequently during the last two decades of sentencing reform. Finally, even those who maintain that judicial factfinding
at sentencing is impermissible agree that additional facts legally relevant
to punishment may be proven to juries as offense elements.
1. Historical Practice:Judicial Discretion
As has been thoroughly chronicled elsewhere, for most of our nation's
history the predominant regime for sentencing convicted defendants was
the exercise of judicial discretion.' 2 0 In fact, because appellate review of
116. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000), construed in Harris, 536 U.S. at 545.
117. See, e.g., Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299 (discussing

WASH. REV.

CODE ANN.

§§ 9A.40.020(1), 9A.40.030(1), 9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii) (West 2000)).
118. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (2006) (increasing criminal history score points based on prior convictions); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table (1992) (increasing punishment ranges for each offense
level based on criminal history category, as determined by number of criminal history
points).
119. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2006) (providing for
downward departure from otherwise-applicable guidelines penalty range upon government
motion certifying "substantial assistance" to government).
120. See, e.g., KATE STITH & Jos8 CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9-29 (1998); Susan R. Klein, The Return of FederalJudicial
Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 696-98 (2005); see also Douglas
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criminal sentences was nearly nonexistent, sentencing authority was
vested not just in judges generally, but exclusively in trial judges. Consequently, those judges had plenary authority to adjudicate whatever facts
above and beyond the offense elements they deemed relevant to evaluating the appropriate punishment to be imposed on the offender. Some
facts might be aggravating, leading the judge to impose a higher sentence
than in its absence; other facts might be mitigating, supporting a comparatively lesser sentence. Moreover, because the power to adjudicate additional facts was discretionary, neither the government nor the defendant
could compel a sentencing judge to consider any particular fact. That is,
judges had the discretion not only make the adjudication whether any
given fact was present or absent, but also to decide which facts were going
to be adjudicated at all.
In Williams v. New York, in 1949, the United States Supreme Court
validated this sentencing regime. 12 1 At sentencing, the judge had considered not only the facts established as offense elements by the jury's felony-murder conviction, but also allegations of Williams' participation in
numerous other burglaries (for which he had not been charged) and evidence of his bad moral character.1 22 Relying in part on this additional
evidence, the judge concluded Williams could not be rehabilitated and
sentenced him to death. 123 The Supreme Court rejected a federal Due
Process Clause challenge to this exercise of judicial discretion to adjudi1 24
cate additional facts at sentencing.
The constitutionality of judicial discretion to adjudicate additional facts
at sentencing apparently remains sacrosanct on the Court today. Although the Justices have not taken any case that presented that question
directly, plentiful dicta in the Apprendi line of cases supports the assessment that the Justices are unanimous in that conclusion. 125 Likewise, the
reasoning used in the majority and dissenting opinions across the Apprendi line of cases is consistent with the same assessment. It appears
quite unlikely, then, that the current Court would see any Due Process
Clause or fundamental fairness defect in permitting judges to exercise
their discretion to adjudicate additional facts at sentencing.
Finally, it should be noted that the regime of judicial discretion to adjudicate punishment facts remains influential in half the state criminal
codes. 126 A handful more states rely on discretionary sentencing by juries
A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHj. LEGAL F. 1, 3-15, 41-52 (emphasiz-

ing rehabilitative model of punishment as conceptual basis for early- and mid-twentieth
century judicial discretionary sentencing regimes and lack of alternative conceptual basis
for late-twentieth century sentencing reform).
121. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
122. See id. at 244.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 245-51; see also Berman, supra note 120, at 4-6 (discussing Williams).
125. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 233; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308-09; Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 481.
126. As of 2004 eighteen states and the District of Columbia had some form of sentencing guidelines, advisory or mandatory, and several more were considering proposals. See
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rather than judges. 127 Although the Court's cases have highlighted determinate sentencing regimes from several states and the federal system,
much criminal sentencing around the country still takes place pursuant to
a sentencing judge's exercise of discretion to decide which facts above
and beyond the offense elements that he or she is going to adjudicate
before determining punishment.
2. Contemporary Developments: Guided and Mandatory Sentencing
As also has been thoroughly chronicled elsewhere, in the last three decades the calls for sentencing reform have become increasingly strong
and increasingly successful. 128 The changes enacted have varied widely
across the fifty-two criminal jurisdictions in the United States. For example, implementing appellate review of sentences prevents individual sentencing judges from deviating too greatly from their peers. 12 9 Abolishing
executive parole authority to release prisoners early achieves "truth in
sentencing" by ensuring that the offender serves the time the judge imposes. 130 Narrowing the punishment ranges provided in the offense statutes reduces the breadth of authority granted to sentencing judges.13 '
Other sentencing reforms, however, were aimed specifically at the process of deciding which additional punishment facts to adjudicate. Some
states adopted advisory guidelines with enumerated additional facts and
factors that sentencing judges and appellate judges should consider, seeking to ensure greater consistency without binding their decisions in any
particular case. 132 Other states and the federal government enacted
mandatory guidelines, specifying with even greater precision which additional facts the judge must adjudicate at sentencing. 13 3 Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, especially in jurisdictions without a guidelines
regime, also compel the sentencing judge to adjudicate a particular
fact. 134 And some statutes or guidelines did the opposite, enumerating
certain factors that sentencing judges were prohibited from considering in
Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy
Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1195 (2005).
127. The current number is five. See Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1790 n.65 (1999)
(Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Texas, and Virginia). Prior to the modern sentencing reform movement, the number was about one-quarter. See Susan R. Klein & Jordan M.
Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal Sentencing, 2002 Sup. CT. REV. 223, 230 &
n.29.
128. See, e.g., STrIH & CABRANES, supra note 120, at 29-48; Berman, supra note 120, at
8-15; Bowman, Beyond Band-Aids, supra note 33, at 151-55; Klein, supra note 120, at 698702; Michael M. O'Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U.
CIN. L. REV. 749 (2005).
129. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 368 (1989).
130. See id. at 367.
131. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113 (West 2006) (providing for up to twenty years' imprisonment for bank robbery), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995) (providing for five-to-ten years' imprisonment for second-degree felonies).
132. See, e.g., Berman, Roots and Realities, supra note 29.
133. See id.
134. See infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
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determining punishment.
Although the kind and extent of sentencing reform differs greatly
across the country, without question the sentencing reform movement
has led to profound changes in the political and legal discourse about
criminal sentencing.1 36 Oversight and accountability of sentencing decisions has become an interest of comparable significance to the exercise of
legal and moral judgment in determining the punishment for a given
offender.
3. Scholarly Commentary: Juries in the Second Stage
Without more, the preceding discussion might suggest-regardless of
how the decision is made about which particular additional facts to adjudicate above and beyond the offense elements-that the power to make
adjudications at sentencing is necessarily a judicial one. But using the jury
as factfinder at sentencing is possible.
Under this alternative, the jury's role would encompass adjudication of
all facts in the case. For example, circumstances such as the defendant's
recidivism, a hate-crime motive, or the exact drug quantity possessed are
frequently deemed important to the determination of punishment. At the
same time they often are not incorporated into the primary criminal code
provisions delineating the statutory offense elements to be proven at
trial-for the very reason that such facts may be highly prejudicial to the
defendant and could taint the jury's fair adjudication of other offense elements. 137 Yet there is no logical reason why the jury cannot still adjudicate them. If the defendant does not admit these punishment facts in a
guilty plea, then a bifurcated proceeding can be used to retain jury adju135. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.1-.12 (2006) (providing
that enumerated facts and circumstances are "not ordinarily relevant" to calculating
Guidelines punishment).
136. One aspect of these second stage adjudications that too often may be overlooked
by policymakers and judges is the amount of procedural due process that should be required. See Berman, supra note 120, at 15-34, 50-52. See generally Alan DuBois & Anne E.
Blanchard, Sentencing Due Process: How Courts Can Use Their Discretion to Make
Sentencings More Accurate and Trustworthy, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 84 (2005). A full discussion of those issues is beyond the scope of this Article. Nothing about the nature of the
second stage determination as I have defined it precludes the application of significant
procedural protections to factual adjudications of additional punishment facts.
137. This argument is a favorite of Justice Breyer's. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 557
(Breyer, J., dissenting)
(At the same time, to require jury consideration of all such factors-say, during trial where the issue is guilt or innocence--could easily place the defendant in the awkward (and conceivably unfair) position of having to deny he
committed the crime yet offer proof about how he committed it, e.g., "I did
not sell drugs, but I sold no more than 500 grams.");
id. at 565 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that hate crime motive sentence enhancement
was constitutional); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998) (opinion
of Breyer, J., for the Court) (citing risk of prejudice to defendant as grounds for interpreting recidivism sentence enhancement as sentencing factor rather than offense element); see
also Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 729 (1998) (opinion of O'Connor, J., for the Court)
("A defendant might not, for example, wish to simultaneously profess his innocence of a
drug offense and dispute the amount of drugs allegedly involved.").
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dication of the disputed fact. 138 Thus, although second stage punishment
facts are not proven at trial, they nevertheless are proven to the jury as
elements of the offense.
Some scholars support exactly this kind of second-stage factfinding,
maintaining that the power to find all facts relevant to punishment is the
province of the jury. 139 Professor Reitz insists that the Court's decisions
in the Apprendi line of cases have not gone far enough: "the goal would
be to apply the Sixth Amendment to factfinding with real impact on sentencing decisions, however that factfinding is incorporated into the overall system. 1 40 Similarly, Professor Kirgis argues that the Sixth
Amendment jury trial guarantee should be coextensive with the Seventh
Amendment protection in civil cases: a constitutional right to jury findings on all questions of fact, "whether those events are relevant at the
liability or the penalty phase of the proceeding." 14 1 Just as in civil cases,
issues of efficiency or fairness may dictate use of separate proceedings to
adjudicate facts related to criminal culpability for the offense first and
facts related to the sanction for that violation second. 14 2 Thus, prejudice,
or any other reason for deeming a fact relevant only to punishment and
not guilt, is not a valid basis for dispensing with jury factfinding in favor
of judicial determination. If additional facts above and beyond those
deemed relevant to guilt must be adjudicated to determine the appropriate punishment or achieve a just sentence, then the jury must serve as the
finder of fact.
It is important to distinguish the expansive position taken by this view
from the much more limited one taken by Court's Apprendi doctrine.
The Rule applies only to a narrowly defined subset of facts that have
mandatory-maximum effect on the penalty range. Those facts are
deemed offense elements that must be proven to the jury; any other relevant punishment facts may be found by judges at sentencing. Under the
view of these scholars, by contrast, the jury must find all facts relevant to
punishment and no authority for judicial factfinding exists. The second138. See Monge, 524 U.S. at 738 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If simultaneous consideration of two elements would be genuinely prejudicial to the defendant (as, for example,
when one of the elements involves the defendant's prior criminal history), the trial can be
bifurcated without sacrificing jury factfinding in the second phase.") (citing AlmendarezTorres, 523 U.S. at 261, 269 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
139. See generally Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Sentencing FactsAfter
Booker: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach the Sixth, 39 GA. L. REV. 895 (2005);
Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and ConstitutionalLaw at CrossPurposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082 (2005).
140. Reitz, supra note 139, at 1119; see also id. at 1119-22 (explaining scope of jury
factfinding right).
141. Kirgis, supra note 139, at 962.
142. The question remains how to get fact questions that are pertinent only to
sentencing before the jury if they are not part of the offense charged in the
indictment. Probably the best answer is to bifurcate the proceedings into culpability and sentencing phases, with the jury issuing a general verdict of
guilty or not guilty first, and then answering a set of interrogatories regarding
the offense-related sentencing factors only if the initial verdict was guilty.
Id. at 965-66.
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stage power to adjudicate punishment facts is recognized, but the only
permissible process for finding those facts is jury determination under
procedures applicable to offense elements.
4.

Second-Stage Controversies: Conclusions

Like the first stage, the second stage of a sentencing decision involves a
controversy over how much and what kind of sentencing power will be
wielded by judges. The history, contemporary practice, and case law authorize significant judicial authority to decide which additional facts to
adjudicate at sentencing above and beyond the offense elements established in the conviction. This authority might be entirely discretionary, in
which case the constitutional doctrines from the first stage have little impact. Even under the most restrictive of those first-stage doctrines, however, after establishing the affected determinate sentencing provisions as
offense elements, there remains considerable room for discretionary decisions by the sentencing judge about which additional facts to adjudicate
prior to making the final punishment determination. Although some
scholars reject the use of any procedure other than jury-determined offense elements to adjudicate the presence or absence of all facts relevant
to punishment, their position has yet to gain political or judicial currency.
In the end, therefore, decisions about which additional facts relevant only
to punishment, not guilt, will be adjudicated at sentencing are an indispensable part of the decision-making process when sentencing a convicted offender.
C.

CONTROVERSIES AT THE THIRD STAGE

At the third stage, the controversy involves determinations of a kind
entirely different from those made in the prior stages. The adjudications
made in the first and second stages are essentially questions of fact. The
decisions made in the third stage, by contrast, are essentially questions of
value. That is, they concern the legal and moral worth, or weight, of the
offense element facts and additional punishment facts. These normative
decisions are made in the course of determining the precise punishment
that should be imposed on the offender. That the third stage involves,
unlike the first and second stages, a distinctively normative decision is a
distinction of tremendous importance in understanding the true stakes in
the debates over sentencing reform and the constitutional law of
sentencing.
The factual adjudications carried out in the first and second stages of a
sentencing proceeding are descriptive in nature. Findings of fact are made
by the jury to determine whether the factual elements of the charged offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or the defendant
waives his right to that jury determination and admits the same facts in
his guilty plea. Additional findings of fact related to punishment also are
made, usually by the judge at a sentencing hearing. These findings of fact
in the first and second stages are comprised of a series of binary, ministe-

20071

The ConstitutionalLaw of Wagging

rial decisions: Is Fact X proven or not proven? There is no normative
analysis to be made of how significant or important any given particular
fact is in the case, but only a descriptive function of declaring its presence
or absence. The inventory of relevant facts that potentially might exist in
the case-offense elements and then punishment facts-is evaluated serially until a final list of established facts is completed. That list then serves
as the basis for justifying the particular sentence that will be imposed on
the given offender.
Taken alone, however, the presence or absence of any specific fact-or
even a complete array of facts-is insufficient to justify a punishment.
Instead, an entirely different determination is necessary as well: How
much each of those facts, and the totality of the facts, counts toward justifying the punishment?
The third stage, then, involves normative decisions about substance: the
legal and moral value of the various facts established in a given case. The
determinations being made are not binary, descriptive questions about
whether a given fact has been established, but rather are judgments about
the significance of a given fact's presence or absence in assessing the level
of punishment to be imposed on the offender. Fact X exists, but how
important is it? Fact Y does not exist in this case, but how much does that
matter? Should Fact X or Fact Not-Y make a relatively substantial difference to the offender's punishment, or a relatively inconsequential one?
Should Fact X or Fact Not-Y have the same importance to Defendant A's
sentence and Defendant B's sentence? Those questions are not adjudications of fact, but instead are normative value determinations about legal
and moral significance.
Unlike adjudication offense elements and additional punishment facts,
moreover, the evaluation of the value of the array of facts might not be
made serially. Instead, the list of established facts might be evaluated simply in its totality, without ever assigning precise values to each particular
component of the overall list. When that occurs, the decisions in the third
stage become even more dissimilar to the adjudications in the first and
second stages.
Consequently, there are numerous ways these decisions about the
value of facts in determining punishment could be carried out in a sentencing regime. These various legal options can be classified into four
general categories.
1. Judicial Judgment
The first category includes sentencing regimes in which decisions about
the value of facts are reserved entirely to the judgment of the sentencing
judge. The judge assigned to each defendant's case evaluates the particular offense elements and additional punishment facts and reaches a conclusion about the appropriate sentence to be imposed. No sources of law
constrain the judge's evaluation of the specific facts separately or in totality. No formal requirement of consistency across multiple cases exists.
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Appellate review, if provided for, might offer an opportunity to invalidate the most dramatically harsh or lenient sentences relative to other
generally comparable cases, but it would provide relief only to the most
outlier sentences. 143 The principal objective is to ensure that each defendant receives the punishment most appropriate for the facts of his or her
case.
Within this category, then, considerable possibility exists for inconsistency among different judges in their assessments of the same or highly
similar facts-and even for inconsistency by a single judge across cases.
The possibility was exacerbated when offense statutes provided for quite
broad sentencing ranges upon conviction. 144 The broader the scope of
available punishments, the greater the likelihood of different sentences
for comparable offenders convicted under the same statute.
In the contemporary era of sentencing reform, the unfettered exercise
of judicial judgment has been vigorously attacked on this very basis. Especially in the aftermath of Judge Marvin Frankel's devastating appraisal
of pervasive arbitrariness in criminal sentencing, 145 critics have lamented
the systemic inconsistencies produced by the lack of any method for ensuring similar treatment of similar cases. At the federal level, the "battle
cry of disparity" led to repeated introduction of sentencing reform bills in
Congress until the ultimate adoption of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.146 Similar concerns led to the adoption of sentencing reform measures in many states.147

Nonetheless, some judges, commentators, and scholars continue to argue in favor of sentencing regimes in the first category. 148 These arguments continue to accept that the ultimate objective of criminal
sentencing should remain ensuring that each defendant receives the most
appropriate punishment for the offense elements and additional punishment facts in the case. They also continue to believe that the particular
judges presiding over each particular defendant's case are best suited to
assessing the legal and moral value of those facts.
For example, Professor Huigens provides a comprehensive justification
for the exercise of judicial discretion at sentencing. Under his view, all
positive law provisions assessing criminal fault must be offense elements
found by the jury, while judges retain the authority to make discretionary
findings of interstitial fault to differentiate among offenders within the
143. Cf. Robert Weisberg & Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Lessons, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10
(2005) ("Gentle consistency and minimization of extreme inequality, not hard equalities,
should be the goal.").
144. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) (West 2006) (providing penalty range of ten
years to life).
145. See generally MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOuT ORDER
(1973); Marvin Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972).
146. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 120, at 104 (chapter title).
147. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 120, at 9-10.
148. But see Weisberg & Miller, supra note 143, at 9-10 ("we risk returning to a world of
unstructured, individualized sentencing-a world that no scholar in this Issue praises or
desires").

2007]

The ConstitutionalLaw of Wagging

limits established by the jury verdict and positive law. 149 The implementation of positive law sentencing factors, no less than the definition and
adjudication of offenses, is necessarily plagued by a "coarse-grained" relationship between provisions of law and moral judgments about punishment. 150 The exercise of judicial discretion to make interstitial findings of
fault, on the other hand, takes account of the myriad other circumstances
the positive law cannot (and, he argues, should not) specify, and therefore achieves a "fine-grained" balance between the imposition of punishment and moral judgment. 151 Judicial discretion therefore is the superior
152
method of determining an individual offender's punishment.
In addition, some scholars favor an alternative discretionary sentencing
regime in which juries, not judges, make the normative value decisions
about punishment facts. 153 The jury's role would include not only
factfinding in the first and second stages, but also the individualized punishment decisions of the third stage.
For proponents of sentencing regimes in the first category, then, the
principal normative focus is the appropriateness of each defendant's sentence rather than systemic consistency.
2.

Advisory Guidelines

Like the first category, sentencing regimes in the second category are
guided by the idea that decisions about the value of facts are best made
by judges. Unlike the first category, however, these regimes make significant accommodations to concerns of consistency and systemic uniformity
in punishments.
In response to the arguments of sentencing reformers, some jurisdictions adopted advisory sentencing guidelines. 154 These measures are provisions of law designed to reduce the possibility of different punishment
outcomes on similar facts without fundamentally altering the authority of
judges generally to decide the legal and moral weight of offense elements
and additional punishment facts. With varying degrees of specificity and
detail, these guidelines instruct sentencing judges not only about which
facts and factors are significant at sentencing (a second-stage function),
but also about the value those facts should carry in the determination of
the particular punishment to be imposed. Those instructions might take
149. See Huigens, Apprendi Puzzle, supra note 18, at 391-92, 433-34; Huigens, supra
note 33, at 1069, 1080-81.
150. See Huigens, supra note 33, at 1072-80.
151. See id. at 1066-72, 1080-81.
152. See id. at 1069.
153. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951 (2003);
Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice,89 VA. L. REV. 311 (2003); Lanni,
supra note 127; see also Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J.
1355, 1372-79 (1999) (analyzing viability of jury sentencing in relation to Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
154. See, e.g., Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 155, 166-67 (2005) (discussing implementation of Virginia and Pennsylvania advisory
guidelines).
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the form of relatively simple recommended enhancements based on certain facts, or more complex calculations
of a "presumptive" sentence
15 5
based on the array of adjudicated facts.
The distinguishing feature of second-category regimes is that these sentencing reform provisions are advisory, not mandatory. A sentencing
judge who declines to follow a recommendation provided in the guidelines, or who rejects a presumptive sentence and imposes a different sentence instead, does not commit reversible error per se. 1 56 Similarly,
appellate courts which affirm sentences variant from the directions in the
guidelines are performing their proper role so long as they find the sentencing judge's determination to be within acceptable bounds. 157 That is,
unlike some sentencing reform measures with similar titles, 158 the provi159
sions serve as "guidelines" in the colloquial sense.
In recent years, some commentators and scholars have argued that sentencing regimes in the second category provide the most effective and
fairest process for determining punishments. 60 Rejecting calls for more
stringent restrictions on judicial authority, they maintain that judgesboth sentencing judges in the trial courts and appellate judges in the
higher courts-are the institutional actors best suited to evaluating the
legal and moral value of the offense elements and additional punishment
facts in the myriad cases that come before them. 16 1 At the same time,
they agree that judges-again, at the trial and appellate levels-should
take on a greater obligation to ensure systemic consistency and uniform162
ity in punishments in comparable cases.
Proponents of regimes in the second category believe that decisions
about the legal and moral value of the facts of particular cases should be
made by judges, while also seeking to guide judges at all court levels to
take better account of the serious concerns about consistency and systemic uniformity in punishments raised by sentencing reformers.
155. See id. at 168-69 (discussing "presumptive" sentences).
156. Although elected state judges have strong incentives to sentence within the presumptive range. See id.
157. See, e.g., State v. Gallion, 678 N.W.2d 197, 201-02 (Wis. 2004) (describing appellate
review for reasonableness of sentences deviating from recommendations of advisory guidelines). The Booker remedial opinion instructed the courts of appeals to review sentences
for "reasonableness" in relation to the sentence calculated under the Guidelines as well as
statutory factors. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005). But see Bowman,
Beyond Band-Aids, supra note 33, at 164, 182-86 (expressing skepticism of meaningfulness
of appellate review of advisory guidelines under reasonableness standard).
158. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt
Disney Pictures 2003) (Captain Barbossa, speaking of the Pirate Code to Elizabeth Swann,
explains that "the code is more of what you would call guidelines than actual rules").
160. See generally, STITH & CABRANES, supra note 120; Berman, Tweaking Booker,
supra note 33; but see Wright, supra note 153, at 1380 ("Coordination of sentences is unlikely to happen without binding sentencing rules.").
161. See, e.g., SMITH & CABRANES, supra note 120, at 6-7, 78-82.
162. See, e.g., id. at 166-77.
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3. Broad ("Simplified") Mandatory Guidelines
The third category includes sentencing regimes in which legislatures
play a dominant role in making decisions about the value of facts. In
these regimes judges are no longer the primary institutional actors responsible for assessing how much weight the presence or absence of particular facts will have in determining the offender's ultimate punishment.
Instead the legislature, or in some jurisdictions an agency exercising delegated legislative authority,1 63 makes many of the normative value decisions. Those decisions are codified in provisions of law that have
mandatory effect-sometimes confusingly titled as "guidelines"-upon
sentencing judges. 164 Although these determinate sentencing provisions
do not abolish judicial value decision-making entirely, the judicial authority that does remain is considerably narrower than in discretionary or ad1 65
visory-guidelines regimes.
The principles underlying third-category regimes are a direct response
to the concerns raised by the sentencing reform movement in the last
three decades. Problems of arbitrariness, inconsistency, and disparity can
be solved if all judges apply the same values to the same facts across
cases. Proponents of third-category systems are not satisfied with the degree of systemic uniformity provided by advisory-guidelines regimes,
however. They believe determinate sentencing provisions are necessary
to achieve an acceptable level of that objective, so mandatory guidelines
must be implemented.
Despite the prominence of this systemic-uniformity objective, however,
third-category regimes do not dispense with all judicial authority to make
decisions of value about facts at the sentencing stage. In adopting
mandatory guidelines and determinate sentencing provisions, the legislature's goal is not absolute consistency-it does not seek to preempt the
166
field of all possible value decisions by making every decision itself.
Rather, the goal is a simpler one of attaining a far greater degree of systemic consistency than judges alone can provide. It is enough, then, to
mandate the precise values to be attached to some of the offense elements and punishment facts adjudicated in the first and second stagesand it is for this reason these guidelines regimes are described as "simplified" by comparison to the fourth category's highly detailed and complex
163. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, for example, are promulgated not by Congress
but an administrative agency, the Sentencing Commission. See generally United States Sentencing Commission, http://www.ussc.gov.
164. For example, prior to Booker the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory.
165. Like advisory guidelines, these determinate sentencing provisions address not only
the third-stage questions of value but also the prior, second-stage questions of which additional facts will be adjudicated at sentencing. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying
text. Unlike advisory guidelines, however, just as the answers to the third-stage questions
are mandatory in determinate sentencing regimes, so too are the answers to those secondstage questions.
166. One kind of value decision is deciding that a certain fact has no value; that is,
assigning a value of zero. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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mandatory-guidelines regimes. 167 The operation of the determinate sentencing provisions thereby creates a narrow range of possible punishments. Although judges are precluded from making value decisions that
override the constraints of these determinate sentencing provisions, they
do retain the authority to make value decisions for the purpose of selecting the appropriate punishment within the mandatory range.
A number of scholars recently have written in favor of simplified
mandatory guidelines. 168 The most comprehensive analysis has been offered by Professor Bowman, who in a series of recent articles has championed a simplified-guidelines regime as the best model for federal
sentencing after Booker.169 Unlike supporters of discretionary sentencing
or advisory guidelines, he believes the mandatory Federal Sentencing
Guidelines have achieved a number of significant successes that should
be preserved. 170 He then argues that simplified guidelines will cure defects that have doomed the existing complex Guidelines. 171 The proposal
how the ideas
has culminated in a Model Reform project demonstrating
172
can be implemented successfully in practice.
Proponents of regimes in the third category take quite seriously the
admonitions of sentencing reformers that uniformity in decisions about
the legal and moral value of the facts used to determine punishments is
necessary for a fair and just sentencing regime. Although these systems
retain some role for judges in making value decisions about punishment
facts to attain some level of individualized consideration of the particular
case, the primary objective is ensuring a high degree of systemic consistency among judges and across cases.
167. Accordingly, these regimes often provide substantial room for judicial deviation
from the presumptive mandatory guidelines sentence. See Reitz, supra note 154, at 168-69.
168. See, e.g., David Yellen, Reforming the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Misguided
Approach to Real-Offense Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 267 (2005); David Yellen, Saving
Federal Sentencing Reform After Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker, 50 VILL. L. REV. 163
(2005). Professor Chanenson would combine simplified mandatory guidelines with the return of parole. See Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 175, 189-94 (2005); Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54
EMORY L.J. 377, 432-58 (2005). Professor Bibas, who opposes Apprendi, see supra note 79,
would use simplified guidelines to work around the Rule. See Stephanos Bibas, Reforming
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely (U. Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No.
04-01, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=634202.
169. See Bowman, Beyond Band-Aids, supra note 33; Frank 0. Bowman III, The Failure of the FederalSentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315
(2005); Frank 0. Bowman III, Mr. Madison Meets A Time Machine: The PoliticalScience of
Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235 (2005). See also Constitution Project
Sentencing Initiative, Excerpt from Principles for the Design and Reform of Sentencing
Systems: A Background Report, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 207 (2006); The ConstitutionProject's
Sentencing Initiative Panel Discussion (Mar. 2005), 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 120 (2005).
170. See Bowman, Beyond Band-Aids, supra note 33, at 161-64.
171. See id. at 164-76 (identifying defects in existing Guidelines); id. at 198-215 (explaining superiority of simplified mandatory guidelines regime).
172. See Frank 0. Bowman III, 'Tis a Gift to Be Simple: A Model Reform of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 301, 302-05 (2006). See generally Constitution
Project Sentencing Initiative, Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative Recommendations
for FederalCriminal Sentencing in a Post-Booker World, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 310 (2006).
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4. Detailed ("Blakely-ized") Mandatory Guidelines
Like regimes in the third category, sentencing regimes in the fourth
category also are characterized by determinate sentencing guidelines
through which legislatures have a dominant role in making decisions
about the value of facts established as offense elements or additional sentencing factors. Unlike the third category, however, in these regimes the
legislature claims the nearly exclusive power to make such value decisions, and denies judges any substantial authority to do so. Accordingly,
these regimes are also characterized by highly detailed and complex systems of mandatory guidelines that prescribe the precise values of particular facts.
In these regimes sentencing reform has reached its apogee of influence,
and concern for systemic uniformity has become truly paramount. Even
the degree of consistency provided by simplified mandatory guidelines is
deemed insufficient because of the residual authority given to judges to
reach different conclusions about the value of some facts in some cases.
Instead, all judges must apply the same values to the same facts across
cases-with no room for disagreement or divergent assessment of value.
The objective of the legislature is absolute consistency in value assessments; the legislature preempts the field of possible value decisions by
making the decisions itself.
To avoid overstating the description too much, however, it should be
noted that this abolition of judicial authority need not be fully literal for a
regime to fall into the fourth category. For example, in the mandatory era
prior to Booker, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was this type of regime. The Guidelines require the sentencing judge to begin with the specified base offense level for the convicted offender's crime, then to modify
the offense level with specific offense characteristics for that crime, adjustments applicable to all offenses, and increments to account for multiple counts of conviction.1 73 Next, the judge calculates the offender's
criminal history category based on the score produced by considering the
type and nature of any prior convictions.' 74 At each step in the process,
the Guidelines prescribe the precise effect of any given adjudicated fact;
for example, two offense levels added for causing injury during a robbery,
or three criminal history points scored for a prior felony. 175 Finally, the
judge cross-references the final offense level and criminal history to determine the mandatory Guidelines sentencing range, such as 12-18, 46-57,
135-168, or 292-365 months. 176 In the mandatory era the judge was required to impose a sentence falling within this range unless the Guidelines itself, through one of the enumerated exceptions in the departure
173. See U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

174. See id. § 1Bl.l(f).
175. See id. §§ 2B3.1(b)(3)(A), 4A1.1(a).
176. See id. § 1B1.1(g)-(h) & Sentencing Table.

§ 1B1.1(a)-(e) (2006).
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provisions, authorized a deviation. 17 7 Thus, although the Guidelines were
a highly detailed system of determinate sentencing provisions, they did
not mandate a literally determinate punishment. Yet the judge's residual
sentencing authority, especially the power to decide the value of particular facts in selecting the appropriate punishment, was insubstantial compared to the effect of the mandatory Guidelines prescribed by Congress
and the Sentencing Commission.
In the aftermath of Blakely and Booker, jurisdictions which had implemented a regime in the fourth category were faced with the choice of how
to respond to those decisions. 178 One option was to shift the regime into
the second category and make previously mandatory guidelines advisory,
as the Supreme Court's remedial opinion in Booker did with the federal
guidelines. 179 The other option was to bring the determinate sentencing
177. See id. § 1B1.1(i). One such departure was authorized when a circumstance was
present in the offender's case that was of a kind (second stage factual adjudication) or to a
degree (third stage normative value decision) not already adequately taken into consideration in the Guidelines. See id. § 5K2.0(a).
178. See, e.g., Steven L. Chanenson & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Evolution and Denial: State
Sentencing After Blakely and Booker, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 1, 1-4 (2005); Tony Ortiz, The
New Mexico Sentencing Commission's Legislative ProposalSubsequent to Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 54, 54-55 (2005); David Louis Raybin, The Anticipated Resolution of the Blakely Split of Authority in the States: Will the United States Supreme Court
Dance the Tennessee Waltz?, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 41, 41-44 (2005). A few states have not
even made the choice yet. See Don Stemen & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Finding the Jury: State
Legislative Responses to Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 7, 8-11 (2005). The
Ohio courts have not yet ruled on Blakely's applicability; the courts in California and New
Mexico have rejected Blakely challenges to their state sentencing regimes; and the courts
in Colorado and New Jersey have identified Blakely problems but the ultimate remedy
remains in flux. See id.; see also Bennett Barlyn, Sentencing Law Under the Knife: Judicial
Surgery, the New Jersey Supreme Court and State v. Natale, 18 FED. SENT'o REP. 35, 35, 37
(2005) (discussing New Jersey); Jonathan D. Soglin & J. Bradley O'Connell, Blakely,
Booker, & Black: Beyond the Bright Line, 18 FED. SENT'c REP. 46, 46-50 (2005) (discussing California). The post-Blakely fate of California's determinate sentencing regime was
pending in the United States Supreme Court during the October 2006 Term. See Cunningham v. California, 126 S. Ct. 1329, 1329 (2006); Michael M. O'Hear, Cunningham: Why
FederalPractitionersand Policy Makers Should Pay Attention, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 260,
260-61 (2006).
179. To date, it appears that Indiana and Tennessee have adopted a solution of this
type. See Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 178, at 9; Wright, Power of Bureaucracy, supra
note 33, at 398-400; see also Tennessee's Post-Blakely Legislation, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 72
(2005). The aftermath of Booker in the federal system, including whether or how Congress
should respond to the decision with legislation, remains a subject of considerable discussion. See, e.g., Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Disparity: Not a Reason to "Fix" Booker, 18
FED. SENT'G REp. 160 (2006); Laura I. Appleman, Rediscovering Retribution: Understanding Punishment Theory After Blakely, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 247, 247 (2006); Douglas A.
Berman, Now What?: The Post-Booker Challenge for Congress and the Courts, 18 FED.
SENT. REP. 157 (2006); Nora V. Demleitner, Where to Go From Here? The Roberts Court
at the Crossroads of Sentencing, 18 FED. SENT'o REP. 221, 221 (2006); Jason Hernandez,
Presumptions of Reasonableness for Guideline Sentences After Booker, 18 FED. SENT'O
REP. 252, 252-53 (2006); Adam Lamparello, The Unreasonableness of "Reasonableness"
Review: Assessing Appellate Sentencing JurisprudenceAfter Booker, 18 FED. SENT'o REP.
174 (2006); Carissa Byrne Hessick, PrioritizingPolicy Before Practice After Booker, 18
FED. SENT'o REP. 167 (2006); Michael H. Marcus, Post-Booker Sentencing Issues for a
Post-Booker Court, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 227, 227-28 (2006); Mark Osler, Ball in a Cup:
The Case for Stability and Patience, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 164 (2006); Stephen R. Sady,
Guidelines Appeals: The Presumption of Reasonableness and Reasonable Doubt, 18 FED.
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statutes into compliance with those holdings by amendments providing
for jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt at trial of all determinate guidelines facts-the so-called "Blakely-ized" mandatory guidelines. 180 Some scholars argued in favor of the latter course to preserve the
mandatory nature of sentencing reforms and continue to assure systemic
1 81
uniformity.
Advocates for adopting sentencing regimes in the fourth category give
primacy to the need for consistency and systemic uniformity in normative
decisions about the legal and moral value of the facts used to determine
punishments. 182 Individualized punishment is achieved not by relying on
judges, but rather through the implementation of a highly detailed and
complex determinate sentencing scheme that incorporates all value decisions about punishment facts that the legislature deems relevant.
5. Aside: Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Statutes
In addition to these four categories of sentencing regimes, there is another type of contemporary sentencing reform that also involves decisions of the value of offense elements or additional punishment facts that
can exist in any of the four regimes. These are mandatory minimum sentencing provisions, which delimit a particular punishment floor when a
particular fact is established.
Some mandatory minimum sentencing provisions are enacted as offense elements that increase the bottom end of the punishment range relative to what would otherwise apply. 18 3 An offense statute might include
a provision that leaves the maximum penalty constant but increases the
minimum penalty if an additional offense element is established. 184 Or an
SENT'G REP. 170 (2006); Jon M. Sands, Roberts' Sentencing Rules of Order, 18 FED. SENT'G

250, 251 (2006).
180. "When the Kansas Supreme Court found Apprendi infirmities in that State's determinate-sentencing regime in State v. Gould, the legislature responded not by reestablishing indeterminate sentencing but by applying Apprendi's requirements to its current
regime. The result was less, not more, judicial power." Blakely v. Washington, 242 U.S.
296, 309-10 (2004) (citations omitted). It appears most of the other states with mandatory
guidelines regimes have followed suit: Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington each has Blakely-ized their sentencing regime, at least in significant
part. See Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 178, at 8-11; Wright, Power of Bureaucracy, supra
note 33, at 395-98; see also Tom Lininger, Oregon's Response to Blakely, 18 FED. SENT'G
REP. 29, 29-31 (2005); Lenell Nussbaum, Sentencing in Washington after Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 23, 24-26 (2005); Dale G. Parent & Richard S. Frase, Why
Minnesota Will Weather Blakely's Blast, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 12, 12-13, 15-16 (2005); Ronald F. Wright, Blakely and the Centralizers in North Carolina, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 19, 1921 (2005).
181. See, e.g., M.K.B. Darmer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely and
Booker: The Limits of Congressional Tolerance and a Greater Role for Juries, 56 S.C. L.
REV. 533, 539, 564-79 (2005); Kirgis, supra note 139; Reitz, supra note 139, at 1085-87,
1109-13. The option of Blakely-izing mandatory guidelines is not without its potential pitfalls. See Berman, Tweaking Booker, supra note 33, at 364-71.
182. Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 178, at 9-10.
183. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 546-47 (2002).
184. For example, a commonly charged federal firearms offense has a maximum penalty of life and mandatory minimum terms of five, seven, and ten years depending on
whether the firearm was possessed, brandished, or discharged. See 18 U.S.C.A.
REP.
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offense might contain penalty tiers, essentially defining lesser but aggravated offenses in a single statutory section. For example, the principal
federal narcotics offense contains penalty ranges of zero to twenty years,
five to forty years, and ten years to life depending upon the quantity of
drugs involved; 185 when a certain threshold quantity of drugs is proven as
an offense-element, the maximum and minimum penalties increase in
tandem. 186 In either instance, once the jury establishes that fact in its verdict or the defendant admits it in a guilty plea, a first-stage offense element adjudication, the statute mandates that no sentence lower than the
prescribed level be imposed, a third-stage value decision.
Other mandatory minimum sentencing provisions take the form of additional punishment facts to be adjudicated at sentencing. For example, if
the offender visibly possessed a firearm while committing a felony enumerated on a list, then regardless of the otherwise-applicable bottom end
of the sentencing range for that felony, the offender must be sentenced to
no less than five years. 187 Similarly, recidivism or detrimental character
evidence, adjudicated at sentencing to avoid prejudicing a trial jury,
might also trigger operation of a mandatory minimum sentence provi§ 924(c)(1)(A) (West 2006). In Harris, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that Congress could have intended the brandishing and discharging minimum-increasing facts to be
offense elements of aggravated offenses; five Justices, however, concluded that Congress in
fact intended them only to be sentencing factors. See Harris,536 U.S. at 548, 556; id. at 552556 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (interpreting as sentencing factors); id. at 572 (Breyer,
J., concurring) (joining plurality's analysis); cf. id. at 576-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that minimum-increasing facts must be proven as offense elements).
185. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)-(b)(1)(A)-(D). Soon after Apprendi, the federal courts of
appeals overturned prior precedent and adopted such an interpretation of § 841. See, e.g.,
United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 660 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc); United States v.
Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 96, 98-99 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc); United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d
150, 152, 156-57 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
186. Currently the federal circuits are divided regarding the interpretation of the
mandatory minimum aspects of the § 841 sentencing tiers. Some circuits hold that, unlike
the minimum-only tiers in § 924(c) in Harris, the maximum-minimum linked tiers in § 841
create elements of the offense in all cases; the mandatory minimum term is inapplicable if
the relevant drug quantity was not found by the jury or admitted in the plea. See United
States v. Gonzalez, 420 F.3d 111, 127-131 (2d Cir. 2005); see also United States v. VelascoHeredia, 319 F.3d 1080, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Graham, 317 F.3d 262,
273-75 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 528-30, 532-34 & n.15 (4th
Cir. 2002). Other circuits hold that the drug quantity ranges can fairly be interpreted as
elements for some purposes but not for others; the mandatory minimum term must be
applied as a sentencing factor in all cases in which the judge finds the fact at sentencing.
See United States v. Goodine, 326 F.3d 26, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Copeland,
321 F.3d 582, 603 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 454 (5th Cir. 2002).
187. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 81-82 & n.1 (1986); see also 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982)
(Any person who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of [enumerated offenses] shall, if the person visibly possessed a firearm during the
commission of the offense, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least
five years of total confinement notwithstanding any other provision of this
title .... Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime ....
The applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing. The court
shall . . . determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if this section is
applicable.).
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sion. 188 That is, these provisions combine a second-stage adjudication of
an additional punishment fact with a third-stage value decision prohibiting the sentencing judge from imposing a lesser punishment.
Thus, these types of sentencing laws can be implemented in any of the
four categories of sentencing regimes. In regimes of judicial discretion or
advisory guidelines, these provisions serve to supersede the value decisions that otherwise would be made by judges. By altering the otherwiseapplicable statutory penalty range by raising the minimum end of the
available sentence, the legislature substitutes its own value decision regarding the punishment consequence of the establishment of that particular fact. In regimes of simplified or detailed guidelines, mandatory
minimum terms might be created in the offenses' statutory ranges or in
the guidelines' punishment ranges. Once again, they serve to alter otherwise applicable penalty ranges by cutting off authority to impose a punishment lesser than that mandated upon establishment of the particular
fact.
Enacting mandatory minimum sentencing provisions enables a legislature to decree specific punishment values for particular facts without having to make fundamental changes to its jurisdiction's overall sentencing
regime. This flexibility in implementation makes mandatory minimum
sentencing provisions a particularly powerful political tool for legislators
eager to appear to be "tough on crime" by taking away judges' power to
be "too lenient" on convicted offenders when certain specific facts are
present. 189 Although mandatory minimum sentences are frequently criticized strenuously on numerous grounds, 190 one of the most frequently
raised objections is that mandatory minimum provisions have resulted in
a severe one-way upward ratchet in criminal sentences without adequate
public discourse about appropriate levels of punishment. 191 Nonetheless,
because these provisions can be adopted in any kind of sentencing regime, their pervasiveness is unlikely to disappear any time soon.
6.

Third-Stage Controversies: Conclusions

The task performed at the third stage of a sentencing proceeding is
fundamentally different from the tasks in the other two stages. Instead of
adjudicating of facts, this stage involves decisions of value. These normative decisions about the legal and moral worth of the offense elements
and additional punishment facts ultimately result in the determination of
188. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e), discussed in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,
16 (2003).
190. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Testimony of Charles Ogletree: DiscriminatoryImpact
of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in the United States, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 273 (2006);
Patricia M. Wald, Testimony of The HonorablePatriciaM. Wald On Behalf of the American
Bar Association, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 284 (2006); see also Harris, 534 U.S. at 569-72
(Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing criticisms of mandatory minimum sentencing laws).
191. See, e.g. , Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Address at the American Bar Association
Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/sp_08-09-03.html.
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the precise punishment to be imposed on the offender. But there is a
great deal of debate and controversy over how such decisions should be
made, and what the principal objective of the decision-making process is.
Should these normative value decisions be made by judges or by legislatures? More difficult, though, is the question of the principal goal of making these decisions in the first place. Is the goal to determine the
individualized just punishment-that is, to ensure that the punishment
imposed in this case fits the particular offense and offender involved? Or
is the goal to determine the extent of society's legal and moral condemnation-that is, to ensure that the punishment imposed in this case is consistent with those imposed in similar cases? The four categories of thirdstage sentencing regimes answer those questions with divergent patterns
of judicial and legislative influence as well as varying degrees of emphasis
on individualized punishment and systemic uniformity.
D.

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE TRIPARTITE ANALYSIS

Breaking down a sentencing decision into these three stages provides
the best analytical framework not only for assessing the validity of the
Supreme Court's reasoning and outcomes in its recent decisions on the
constitutional law of sentencing, but also for debating the future of sentencing reform legislation and the nature of sentencing. By specifying
more precisely which stage or stages are implicated in a given debate, the
disagreements and arguments can be isolated to the particular principles
and positions actually in conflict. The salutary effects of this analytical
clarity extend far beyond constitutional doctrines to all discussions and
proposals for sentencing reform.
One advantage provided by the tripartite analysis is a more precise delineation of the nature of the actions being taken during a sentencing
proceeding. For purposes of both implementation of sentencing laws and
appellate review of sentencing decisions, this specification of function illustrates more vividly what really is taking place and what really is at
stake in debates over sentencing reform.
At the implementation phase, the analysis isolates the function being
performed with improved clarity. In the first and second stages, the function is the adjudication of facts. The nature of the action of carrying out
that function is descriptive-a ministerial determination of a binary
choice between whether a given fact has, or has not, been established
under the applicable procedures. At the first stage, that determination
can only be the constitutional requisites for offense elements: proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a jury trial or admission in a guilty plea. At
the second stage, procedures applicable to this function are contested:
they might involve a judge exercising discretion about which facts to consider or not consider, proof of specified sentencing factors to a judge pursuant to statutes or mandatory or advisory guidelines, or even the full
requisites of offense elements. Regardless of these variations, however,
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the fundamentally descriptive nature of the action being taken in this
stage remains the same.
In the third stage, by contrast, the function is a decision about the punishment value of those established facts. That action is definitively normative-it is an exercise of reasoned judgment about the legal and moral
significance of the existence of the array of proven facts. 192 In that way
the function being performed at the third stage is fundamentally different
from that of the other two stages. Because of this, conflating the third
stage with the prior two is mistaken. 193 Yet it is exactly such conflation
that often leads to analytical confusion and unpersuasive arguments in
debates over sentencing reform.
The tripartite analysis also provides improved clarity from the perspective of appellate review of sentencing decisions. In the first and second
stages, standards of review applicable to verdicts and findings of fact
would govern. The facts adjudicated in the first stage are offense elements. On appeal from a jury verdict, findings of fact comprised in the
verdict will not be disturbed unless the defendant can succeed on a claim
of insufficiency of the evidence; that is, "only if the record is devoid of
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" once inferences are drawn in favor of the verdict. 194 Accord192. One method for ensuring that third stage normative decisions are in fact reasoned
judgments about the punishment value of facts, rather than arbitrary decrees, is to require
sentencing judges to delineate their normative decisions in written opinions. See, e.g.,
Steven L. Chanenson, Write On!, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 146, 146-47 (2006), available
at http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/chanenson.html (citing Marc L. Miller, Guidelines
Are Not Enough: The Need for Written Sentencing Opinions, 7 BEHAV. SCL & L. 3 (1989));
see also, e.g., Berman, supra note 8, at 410-12 (discussing importance of exercising of reasoned judgment in judicial discretionary sentencing authority); Douglas A. Berman, Reasoning Through Reasonableness, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 142, 144 (2006), available at
http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07berman.html.
193. Professor Huigens argues that the opposite is true: in his view, analytically separating the first and second stages from the third stage is mistaken. He maintains that all findings of "fact" in criminal law are not simply descriptive, but also normative judgments. See
Huigens, supra note 33, at 1060-63, 1073-74. The examples he provides are findings that
seem to implicate substantial degrees of moral judgment: what qualifies as an unjustifiable
risk disregarded by a recklessness mens rea, what constitutes consent in a rape case, or
whether a homicide was heinous or depraved. See id. Other possible examples, however,
seem far removed from those: whether the defendant did or did not fire his gun, what
quantity of drugs was found in a given container, or what amount of money was taken from
a bank teller during a robbery. Moreover, to the extent normative assessments are made in
first or second stage adjudications, they are distinct from third stage value decisions. When
normative considerations are involved in factfinding, such as whether the defendant acted
with a recklessness mens rea, they are principally aimed at authorizing punishment in the
first instance. Normative considerations involved in value decisions, by contrast, are principally aimed at determining the degree of punishment-such as how severely or leniently a
reckless offense should be punished relative to others. Thus, while it may be true that the
determination of whether certain "facts" are present or absent in a given case may have a
normative component, the exercise of finding facts in adjudicating offense elements or
punishment facts is primarily descriptive.
194. United States v. Carrillo, 435 F.3d 767, 775 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v.
Oslund, 453 F.3d 1048, 1059 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Only if 'no interpretation of the evidence...
would allow a reasonable-minded jury to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt' will
we reverse a jury's verdict on the grounds of insufficient evidence.") (quoting United
States v. Martin, 412 F.3d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 2005)); id. at 1059-60 (rejecting insufficiency of
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ingly, those findings of facts are exceptionally difficult, if not practically
impossible, to overturn on appeal. 195 Lesser procedural requirements
usually are used in the second stage, and the defendant's capacity to contest and overturn the finding of additional punishment facts is correspondingly greater. For example, findings of fact made by a sentencing
judge pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (both before and
after Booker) are subject to the196somewhat less stringent clearly erroneous
standard of review on appeal.
The standard of review applicable to the normative value decisions
made in the third stage is not so obvious, however. On the one hand,
normative decisions might be viewed as analogous to decisions on questions of law, which are reviewed de novo and accordingly can be reversed
based on the appellate court's own reasoning or analysis with no deference owed to the trial court's. 197 On the other hand, such decisions might
be compared to decisions on questions of judgment, which are reviewed
evidence claim relating to credibility of eyewitness who identified defendant); Carrillo,435
F.3d at 775-76 (rejecting insufficiency of evidence claim relating to proof of participation
in, and specific intent for, conspiracy charge); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)
(holding that
[t]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, holding that any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier
of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and
to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as
weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon
judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most
favorable to the prosecution.)
(internal citations omitted).
195. See Priester, supra note 8, at 923-28. Challenges to facts established by guilty plea
are even more difficult to overturn. Many guilty plea agreements require the defendant to
waive the right to appeal the conviction and sentence. Even if the defendant can appeal,
the express admission of offense element facts in the plea colloquy cannot be overcome
except by overturning the validity of the plea in its entirety.
196. See, e.g., United States v. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2006) (reversing district court's Guidelines decision not to impose a fine based on finding of fact of
inability to pay "in light of the defendant's admission (that he had 'accumulated some
modest wealth' and was 'capable of paying a modest fine') and his considerable assets
(between $1 and $1.5 million)."); United States v. Willis, 433 F.3d 634, 636 (8th Cir. 2006)
(declining to reverse Guidelines determination of drug quantity involved in conspiracy
where "ample evidence supports" district court's factual finding). A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous if, after viewing all the evidence from trial, the appellate court is "left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
197. Unlike findings of fact, issues of law are reviewed de novo. See, e.g., United States
v. Paley, 442 F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that "[w]e review the district court's
determination of the facts concerning the amount of money involved in a money laundering scheme only for clear error. We review the district court's interpretation of the sentencing guidelines de novo.") (citations omitted); United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 451
(6th Cir. 2001) (stating that "[i]n reviewing a trial court's evidentiary determinations, this
court reviews de novo the court's conclusions of law and reviews for clear error the court's
factual determinations that underpin its legal conclusions"); United States v. Dakota, 197
F.3d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 1999) (reviewing de novo "district court's conclusions" of law [as to]
whether evidence offered at trial constituted hearsay within the meaning of the Federal
Rules of Evidence).
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for abuse of discretion and are reversed only if the trial court "manifests a
clear error of judgment" in reaching the ruling it does. 198 And in fact, the
four categories of sentencing regimes reflect differing assessments of the
nature of the normative value decisions. Discretionary-sentencing regimes and advisory-guidelines regimes reserve considerable judicial authority to determine normative value. In those regimes, then, deferential
review for abuse of discretion would be expected. Mandatory-guidelines
regimes, whether simplified or detailed, by contrast, are characterized by
the legislature substituting its own normative decisions for some or all of
the sentencing judge's authority to decide the value of facts. In such regimes, de novo review of value decisions likely would apply. Again the
distinctly different nature of the third stage comes into stark relief. Unlike the easily assessed descriptive adjudications of fact, the nature of the
third stage's function is, itself, part of the debate over sentencing reform.
Whether the normative value decisions being made in the third stage are
matters of law or matters of judgment is only one part of the controversy.
Another advantage of the tripartite analysis in improving the clarity of
debates over the constitutional law of sentencing and sentencing reform
is the manner in which the analysis helps to frame the discussion of the
stakes involved. Sometimes these discussions take place in terms of an
institutional battle for power, particularly between legislatures and
judges. Other times the emphasis falls on the clash between the relative
importance of assuring individualized punishment for offenders and systemic equality across cases. Unfortunately, these discussions often take
place without carefully specifying which issues are involved, and when.
To the extent it allocates institutional power between the legislature
and judge, the first stage ought not be controversial at all. Judicially created common law offenses are all but nonexistent in contemporary
American criminal law. 199 Criminal offenses and their punishment ranges
are indisputably the province of the legislature.20 0 Just as a prosecutor
198. United States v. Martinez, 455 F.3d 1127, 1129 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that
"'[w]e review a district court's refusal to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion,' which
means we will reverse only if the decision. . . manifests a clear error of judgment.") (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 1130 (rejecting claim that denial of mistrial constituted abuse of discretion); United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2006)
(rejecting claim that admission of testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence constituted
abuse of discretion); United States v. Martinez, 418 F.3d 1130, 1133-34 (10th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting claim that four-level Federal Sentencing Guidelines departure was abuse of discretion). If the identified error made by the trial court is not one of judgment, however, but
rather one of fact or law, then the less deferential standards of review applicable to those
determinations, respectively, will be applied by the appellate court. See, e.g., Martinez, 455
F.3d at 1129 ("We review a district court's refusal to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion,
which means we will reverse only if the decision was based on a clearly erroneous finding
of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of judgment."); United
States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that "[t]his standard [of
review] is consistent with the Supreme Court's admonition, . . . that we review evidentiary
decision for an abuse of discretion, because it is an abuse of discretion to make errors of
law or clear errors of factual determination") (internal quotations omitted).
199. Priester, supra note 8, at 891-92 & n.151.
200. Id. at 891-92.
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cannot charge an offense that does not exist, or a jury cannot convict of
an offense that has not been charged, so too a judge cannot punish the
offender outside the terms of the statute under which he or she has been
convicted. 20 1 To do so would be ultra vires and a violation of constitutional principles as fundamental as the separation of powers and the rule
of law. 20 2 Although the first stage has some role to play in delimiting the
range of punishment a convicted offender faces, the breadth or narrowness of those limitations is plainly a matter of legislative power. If the
offense elements defined by statute are accompanied by a broad punishment range, then adjudication of that offense has comparatively little influence on determining the final penalty. The converse is true when the
statutory offense elements have a corresponding narrow penalty range.
The important point, however, is that the first stage alone involves only
a preliminary step in the process from adjudicating a defendant's guilt to
determining the exact sentence to be imposed on a convicted offender.
Answering the questions of what offense elements are required to be
proven and what penalty range is provided by that statute upon conviction, is necessary but not sufficient for calculating punishment.
It is the second stage, then, that actually features the battle for institutional power between legislatures and courts that has been waged since
the beginning of the Apprendi line of cases. In recent decades of sentencing reform, many legislatures have not been content with simply defining
criminal offenses and broad penalty ranges and leaving the selection of
the appropriate punishment to the sentencing judge. Instead they have
enacted various sentencing reform measures, from solitary mandatoryminimum provisions to complete guidelines regimes, by which legislatures-through the prosecutors as their enforcement intermediaries 203can constrain the power of judges at sentencing. Naturally judges have
resisted this diminution in their power, seeking to circumvent or invalidate such measures to retain their traditionally extensive power at sentencing. In the Apprendi line of cases, the Supreme Court invoked the
jury trial guarantee in the Sixth Amendment to justify a victory for judicial power. Yet because of the inapposite constitutional basis 2° 4 and nonsensical distinctions 20 5 made by the Rule, this supposed triumph is
strangely limited.
The important point here is that although the operation of the Court's
Rule requires that certain facts be established as offense elements rather
than sentencing factors, the Rule actually implicates the second stage far
more than the first. This is true because it has only narrow application to
certain kinds of determinate sentencing provisions that increase the Ruledefined "maximum" penalty. All other kinds of sentencing provisions201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 896, 899.
See id. at 894-95, 897-99.
See id. at 893-94.
See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.

2007]

The ConstitutionalLaw of Wagging

such as advisory guidelines, all forms of discretionary judicial sentencing,
and even to those determinate sentencing provisions that do not affect the
Rule-defined "maximum" penalty-are untouched by the Court's doctrine. The Court's Rule leaves the vast majority of the second stage free
from its new constitutional law of sentencing. Although one possible resolution of the second-stage controversies is to essentially abolish the sec206 most
ond stage and turn all punishment facts into offense elements,
participants in the sentencing reform debate do not argue for such an
outcome. Thus, even if some forms of determinate sentencing provisions
must be shifted back into the first stage, there remains a considerable role
for the second stage of a sentencing decision.
The third stage of a sentencing decision, unlike the previous stages,
addresses a completely different question. Decisions about the punishment value of adjudicated facts give normative measure to the legal and
moral weight of the defendant's situation. Rather than allocating institutional power, the third stage allocates the relative significance of two fundamental values-individualized punishment and systemic uniformity.
Those who emphasize the goal of individualized justice oppose bright
lines and fixed rules at the third stage to enable each case to be judged on
its own facts and circumstances. By contrast, those who emphasize the
goal of systemic uniformity favor such measures because they ensure that
the idiosyncratic nature of a particular case does not interfere with consistency and equal treatment across all sentencing proceedings. Although
the Court's opinions and the scholarly commentary often do not specify
the discussion on these terms, the reality is that most of the disputes over
the constitutional law of sentencing and the future of sentencing reform
generally are third-stage controversies. For that reason, separating the
third-stage questions from the first and second stages will provide greater
clarity to the discussions.
The important point about the third stage is that these contrasting goals
of individualized punishment and systemic uniformity need not correlate
with institutional power. The opinions of the Court, and sometimes even
analyses in the scholarly debate, seem to assume that judges mete out
individualized punishment and legislatures prescribe systemic uniformity.
Clarifying the nature of the third stage demonstrates that this need not be
the case. Judges do not need to pursue only individualized punishment
through the exercise of discretionary power at sentencing; their decisions
might be shaped by advisory guidelines and rigorous appellate review by
other judges to ensure a significant degree of systemic uniformity. Likewise, legislatures need not impose modes of systemic uniformity like
mandatory-minimum provisions or highly detailed mandatory guidelines
that eliminate all (or nearly all) judicial discretion; they might achieve a
greater degree of systemic uniformity by enacting mandatory guidelines
that impose broad constraints while also reserving some degree of individualization within that regime as well.
206. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
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One of the great advantages of the tripartite analysis, then, is illuminating this distinction. Disagreements that are really about the third-stage
clash between individualized punishment and systemic uniformity should
be carried out on those normative terms, without muddling the debate by
assuming those objectives necessarily require any particular arrangement
of institutional powers. The second and third stages of the analysis do
distinct work in the determination of punishment, and assessing those
functions separately is crucial for preserving clarity in the discussion. Different judges or different legislatures might agree that certain facts-such
as an offender's recidivist history, the degree of the victim's bodily injury,
or the extent of the victim's monetary loss-should be included in the
array of additional punishment facts at the second stage, while disagreeing about the normative punishment value of those facts at the third
stage. 207 Similarly, different judges or legislatures might agree that certain facts-such as an offender's race, religion, or socio-economic status-are improper criteria for distinguishing among offenders, barring
their adjudication at the second stage and thereby ensuring no consideration at the third stage. 20 8 Specifying which kind of decision is being made,
and why, focuses on the underlying reasons for assessing the decision as
right or wrong.

207. One concern, for example, is that judges in different geographic locations will assess similar cases differently. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variationsin Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 137, 139-40 (2005); Ian Weinstein, The HistoricalRoots
of Regional Sentencing Variation, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 495, 498-99 (2006).
208. This situation of overlapping outcomes between the second and third stages is
worth a bit more elaboration. When a given fact is not adjudicated in the second stage, that
fact necessarily carries a weight of zero in the third stage. That is, the fact simply is not part
of the array of offense element facts and additional punishment facts upon which normative value decisions are made. Of course, the same functional result could be achieved by
adjudicating the existence of the fact in the second stage but then assigning it a weight of
zero in the third stage. That is, the fact is part of the array of facts but is found to produce
no normative effect. Either way, the fact has no effect on the offender's sentence. Nonetheless, the implications of making that zero-worth determination at the second or third stage
are different, and important. Take the examples of the offender's "good works" before or
after his crimes compared to his race. The offender might seek to present evidence of his
good works in the second stage as a proffered reason for leniency and mitigation of his
punishment in the third stage. If the evidence is adjudicated but ultimately found to have
no mitigating effect, the consequence is that although the evidence was insufficient to produce any effect in this case, stronger evidence in other cases might produce an effect. By
contrast, if the offender sought a second stage adjudication of his race as a proffered reason for leniency and mitigation of his punishment in the third stage-or if the prosecution
sought the same finding as grounds for aggravation-the claim would be rejected out of
hand. Legally and socially powerful values of race-blind justice are served when a judge
declines to adjudicate, or the legislature prohibits adjudication of, the fact of the offender's
race in the second stage. Permitting that fact into the mix at the third stage, even if it
ultimately carries zero weight toward aggravating or mitigating the penalty, simply does
not serve those values in the same way-because unlike good works, which might make a
difference in some cases, race cannot be allowed to matter in any case. Thus, although the
functional outcome on punishment may be the same, extrinsic considerations of law and
policy determine whether that outcome is achieved by a mandate that a given fact not be
considered at the second stage or by a determination that it has zero worth in the third
stage does in fact matter.
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Finally, the tripartite analysis clarifies not only the doctrinal disputes in
the constitutional law of sentencing, but also the terms of the broader
debate over sentencing reform measures in general. Although the first
and second stages have some role to play in those debates, the real stakes
come in the third stage's balancing of individualized punishment and systemic equality. For example, calls for legislatures to enact more carefully
drafted criminal offenses with more nuanced penalty ranges probably are
not motivated by concern for the first-stage balance of institutional power
between legislature and judge for its own sake, but rather a third-stage
objective of achieving greater systemic equality. Reducing judicial discretion is not an end in itself, but only a derivative goal pursued as a means
of achieving the ultimate end. Similarly, much of the opposition to
mandatory sentencing guidelines that superficially appears to be motivated by second-stage concerns about identity of the factfinder and burden of proof usually has, at its core, a third-stage goal of maximizing
individualized punishment. Once again, reducing legislative power and
preserving judicial discretion are not valued for their own sake; instead,
they are simply derivative goals along the way to the ultimate objective.
The tripartite analysis serves to break through these facades and focus on
the true goals of proponents and opponents of various sentencing reform
measures.
IV. DEFINING DOGS, TAILS, AND WAGGING: THE FUTURE
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SENTENCING
AND SENTENCING REFORM
In the end, the tripartite analysis demonstrates that, no matter the issues and controversies abounding in the constitutional law of sentencing
in particular and sentencing reform in general, the ultimate question can
be reduced to the simple terms of the canine metaphor. For purposes of
both constitutional law and sentencing policy, it is necessary to define not
only the offense dog and sentencing tail, but also what constitutes wagging. How significant must the effect of the offense elements over the
ultimate punishment be to ensure that the dog is wagging the tail? When
do sentencing decisions become so significant that they superseded the
offense of conviction and cause the tail to wag the dog? Conversely, what
kinds of sentencing decisions ought to be deemed permissible, despite
their significance, because they do not override the dog's power to wag
the tail? The framework provided by the tripartite analysis focuses the
debate about the Apprendi line of cases and the future of sentencing reform on the deepest implications of the doctrinal and normative choices
made by the Court and illustrates why decreeing those choices as constitutional law is so problematic.
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ASSESSING THE SUPREME COURT: POWER GRABS AND

HIDDEN MOTIVES

Examining the Apprendi line of cases through the lens of the tripartite
analysis reveals the full extent of the aggrandizement of judicial power
executed by the Court. If the only problem was that the Court's purported Sixth Amendment justification is inapposite and produces absurd
doctrinal results, the solution might seem to lie in revising the existing
doctrines at the margins. The problem with the Court's doctrines is far
more significant, however. What the Court has done is mandate its own
particular, highly contestable vision of the nature of the sentencing process as federal constitutional law. In doing so the Court has placed substantial obstacles in the path of several prominent modes of
contemporary sentencing reform which rely on equally particular and
contestable visions. The Court has acted without identifying the constitutional basis for its mandate and without explaining why the Constitution
privileges its vision of the nature of sentencing. Consequently, its holdings are nothing more than a sheer power grab by the Court on behalf of
judges and at the expense of legislatures.
At all three stages, the Court has imposed on Congress and the states a
particular vision of the natures of the sentencing process. At none of
these stages has the Court adequately explained its rationales. Of course,
the likely reason for that failure is that the Court's commands are unjustified and legislatures should be free to implement the sentencing process
in other ways.
At the first stage, the Court initially followed the correct course by
adopting, if for the wrong reasons, the Apprendi-Harris doctrine. 20 9 Rejection of the pure positivism position advocated by the dissent is not
explained by the Sixth Amendment, but is easily defensible in terms of
the constitutional structure of criminal procedure. 210 That is, the Apprendi-Harrisdoctrine does not diminish legislative power or expand judicial power, but rather balances power between all the institutions
involved by ensuring that the ultimate sentence imposed is consistent not
only with the legislature's criminal code in general, but with the terms of
the specific criminal offense charged by the prosecution and proven to
211
conviction by jury or plea.
The Court has gone astray by further expanding the doctrines applicable at the first stage. Unlike the Apprendi-Harris doctrine, the BlakelyBooker expansion is not about preserving the integrity of the offense of
conviction. Once an offense has been defined, charged, and proven, it
remains for a particular sentence to be imposed on the individual offender-and so long as the scope of available punishment delimited by
that offense of conviction is observed, then no constitutional violation is
produced when additional factfinding and normative judgment are car209. See Priester, supra note 8, at 855.
210. See id. at 896-902.
211. See supra notes 57-64, 92-96 and accompanying text.
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ried out in the second and third stages. 212 Yet the Blakely-Booker expansion deems unconstitutional certain types of sentencing provisions which
constrain the sentencing authority of judges and declares that such provisions can only be enforced if established as offense elements in the first
stage. 213 A much greater number of sentencing provisions would be
deemed unconstitutional in the not-at-all-implausible eventuality that
Harrisis overruled and the mandatory-effects position is imposed, a doctrinal result firmly advocated by four justices. 2 14 Under both positions,
however, it is only provisions that have mandatory constraining power
over judicial sentencing discretion that run afoul of the Court's doctrines;
the use of numerous similar, even functionally identical, second- and
third-stage sentencing determinations remains unaffected.
The tripartite analysis therefore exposes the Court's action for what it
is: a crass power grab that diminishes legislative power in favor of sentencing judges. The Court is not, for example, adopting a comprehensive
conception of second-stage adjudications that deems all comparable findings of fact permissible or impermissible based on some intrinsic aspect of
the finding's effect on the offender's sentence. Instead the Court's doctrine, whether the current Blakely-Booker expansion or the mandatoryeffects position, assesses solely how the provision at issue affects judicial
power at sentencing. If the provision constrains judges to find certain
facts with mandatory limitations on judicial discretion, or compels judges
to assign specific normative values to the existence of certain facts, then it
is unconstitutional to apply the provision at sentencing. If the provision
does not constrain factfinding or impose normative valuations, then there
is no constitutional violation at sentencing. 2 15 The dispositive question is
whether sentencing judges, rather than legislatures, are making the second- and third-stage decisions that affect the offender's sentence.
The Court has not provided a credible constitutional analysis justifying
the imposition of the Blakely-Booker expansion of its doctrines. Certainly
the Sixth Amendment jury trial right cannot be the source of these mandates, because the right to jury factfinding is triggered under the doctrines only after it has been determined that the provision involved
interferes with judicial power at sentencing. The claim of preserving jury
power, then, is plainly pretextual. Any attempt to ground the Court's
analysis in Due Process Clause principles would be likewise nonsensical;
it would strain all credulity to assert that the functionally identical sentencing determination can be fundamentally unfair in some situations and
not in others, yet that is exactly the inconsistent treatment produced by
212. See Priester, supra note 8, at 902-09.
213. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text
214. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
215. Cf. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 284 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that by severing the statutory provisions making the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
mandatory to make them advisory, the Booker remedial majority "expands, rather than
limits, judicial power").
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the absurd formalisms of the Court's doctrines. 216 Similarly, in Structuring Sentencing, I explained why the constitutional structure of criminal
procedure also cannot justify a constitutional
doctrine broader than the
2 17
basic Apprendi-Harrisprinciple.
The most plausible conclusion, then, is that the reason the Court has
not provided a sound constitutional justification for mandating its own
particular, highly contestable vision of sentencing as federal constitutional law is because one does not exist. What is unconstitutional about
legislatures regulating the adjudication of facts at the second stage
through the use of sentencing factor provisions? What is unconstitutional
about legislatures specifying the normative value of facts in calculating
punishment in the third stage? Nothing, it would seem, except that judges
want to wield that power themselves. The Court's Blakely-Booker expansion is not a bold effort to safeguard profound constitutional rights
against legislative encroachment, but rather is a mundane overstepping of
the bounds of power solely to defend parochial institutional interests.
The tripartite analysis also helps to reveal the hidden motives concealed beneath the veneer of the Court's opinions. It is possible, of
course, that some Justices do seek to increase judicial power as an end in
itself. They might believe that legislatures are ill-suited to ensure justice
in criminal sentencing for any number of reasons, such as constituent
pressure, political incentives, or simply relative institutional competence. 21 8 It is likewise possible that other Justices support legislative primacy as an end in itself, believing that the separation of powers vests
legislatures with authority to adopt sentencing policy even if they are unfair, ineffectual, or disparaging of judicial judgment. 2 19 But as with sentencing reform debates generally, the more convincing explanation is that
the Justices view the allocation of institutional power as an instrumental
means for achieving deeper, more important ends.
When examined at this deeper level, the divide between the Justices
forming the Apprendi-Blakely-Booker majority and those in dissent mirrors the same foundational debate discussed above: the division between
216. See supra Parts I1.B.4 & II.C.

217. See Priester, supra note 8, at 902-09.
218. See, e.g., Rachel Barkow, The Political Market for Criminal Justice, 104 MICH. L.

REV. 1713, 1715, 1718 (2006); Rachel Barkow, Separation of Powers and the CriminalLaw,
58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 989, 997-1011 (2006); Frank 0. Bowman III, Murder, Meth, Mammon, and Moral Values: The Political Landscape of American Sentencing Reform, 44

WASHBURN L.J. 495, (2005); Bowman, Mr. Madison, supra note 169, at 236; William J.
Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509-11 (2001).
219. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568-69 (2002) (holding that
[t]he Court is well aware that many question the wisdom of mandatory minimum sentencing. Mandatory minimums, it is often said, fail to account for
the unique circumstances of offenders who warrant a lesser penalty. These
criticisms may be sound, but they would persist whether the judge or the jury
found the facts giving rise to the minimum. We hold only that the Constitution permits the judge to do so, and we leave the other questions to Congress, the States, and the democratic processes.)
(citations omitted).
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those pursuing individualized punishment as the primary objective of sentencing, and those seeking systemic uniformity as the principal objective.
The real stakes are the third-stage determinations of the normative punishment value of facts. The majority Justices and the dissenters hold opposing visions of the fundamental nature of the sentencing process-and
both groups seek to write their vision into federal constitutional law.
While the Justices forming the majority in favor of the ApprendiBlakely-Booker doctrine have a clear motivation for protecting judicial
discretionary power at sentencing from legislative encroachment, their
deeper motivation appears to be a rejection of any normative necessity
for systemic uniformity and a corresponding insistence on individualized
punishment as the fundamental normative objective of sentencing. Of
course the majority's doctrine invalidates legislative attempts to pursue
systemic uniformity and bolsters judges' assertions of unregulated sentencing discretion. But the rejection of uniformity is more profound, for it
also repudiates defendants' attempts to seek harmonization of
punishments:
We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad
discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range .... For
when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence
within a defined range, the defendant has no right220
to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.
In the majority's view, then, once the outer limits of the possible penalty
are established by the jury's verdict (pursuant to offense statutes,
mandatory sentencing guidelines, or both), the offender's worst-case scenario has been determined, and any sentence imposed less than that maximum is a windfall. 221 All defendants convicted of the same offense
elements will of course face that same worst-case scenario; as long as any
given defendant is sentenced somewhere within the limits for his or her
particular offense of conviction, all the uniformity that is necessary has
been provided.2 22 Any differences in punishment that might be portrayed
as disparities by comparison to another seemingly similar offender do not
give rise to any constitutionally cognizable claim for relief for the very
reason that the only constitutionally cognizable interest the defendant
possesses is a jury determination of the worst-case scenario.
Ultimately, to the majority, the concern for systemic uniformity is illusory. Within the range of penalties authorized for the offense of convic220. Booker, 542 U.S. at 233.
221. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's description of the leniency-as-windfall argument).
222. If Harrisis overruled and the mandatory-effects position adopted by a majority of
the Court, the same reasoning would follow. The defendant's constitutional entitlement
would be to a jury determination of the maximum and minimum sentence authorized by
statute, mandatory sentencing guidelines, or both. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text (describing mandatory-effects position). The defendant does not, however, have
any constitutional claim against exercise of judicial discretion to adjudicate additional facts
or determine normative value in deciding upon the specific punishment within that range
of penalties. See id.
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tion, the only relevant goal is the determination of the individualized
punishment for each offender. Broad ranges of available penalties best
serve this goal by providing greater capacity to tailor the punishment to
the facts and circumstances of the particular case. To the extent legislatures seek to restrict this pursuit of individuality, the Apprendi-BookerBlakely doctrine (or the mandatory-effects position, were it to be
adopted) requires that they do so only by complying with the high procedural hurdles applicable to elements of the offense. 223 The doctrine
thereby serves as a deterrent to the legislative pursuit of systemic uniformity and privileges the pursuit of individualized punishment.
The Justices dissenting from the imposition of the Apprendi-BlakelyBooker doctrine have an equally clear but opposing motivation-sustaining the constitutional validity of sentencing provisions that restrict judicial sentencing discretion in furtherance of legislative sentencing reform
goals-and a correspondingly contrary deeper motivation that rejects the
normative necessity of individualized punishment and insists that achieving significant levels of systemic uniformity across cases is the fundamental normative objective of sentencing. 224 The dissenters expressly assert
that proponents of sentencing reform are correct in their claims that justice requires consistency of punishments in similar cases, and they accordingly oppose the erection of any constitutional law obstacles to legislative
efforts to achieve greater systemic uniformity by constraining judicial sentencing discretion-even to the point of permitting sentencing enhancements that exceed the authorizations of the offense of conviction. 225 That
is, individualized punishment cannot be said to be doing justice if disparities and inconsistencies across the system mean that similar cases are receiving divergent individualized assessments. Sentencing reform
measures that reduce individualization of punishment in favor of systemic
uniformity, therefore, are necessary to achieving justice.
For example, in the Booker remedial majority opinion, Justice Breyer
goes to great lengths to defend the real offense sentencing regime created
by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 226 He concedes that a detailed
consideration of the facts and circumstances of the offense and offender
in each particular case is a worthy goal-but he insists that such consideration must be carried out in a consistent, systemically uniform manner
which ensures that all sentencing judges take account of the same array of
relevant and immaterial circumstances (second-stage adjudications of
fact) and assign the same punishment significance to them (third-stage
value decisions). 227 He argues that sentencing factors are necessary for
two principal reasons: one, offense elements alone are too unwieldy to
223. See Priester, supra note 8, at 914-16.
224. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 564 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
id. at 552-54 O'Connor, J., dissenting).
225. That position, I argued in StructuringSentencing, is inconsistent with the constitutional structure of criminal procedure. See Priester, supra note 8, at 896-902.
226. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 246-68.
227. See id. at 249-58 (Part II of remedial majority opinion by Breyer, J.).
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assure the necessary degree of specificity, and two, many facts directly
relevant to punishment either are irrelevant to the adjudication of guilt or
are highly prejudicial. 228 Implementing a real offense mandatory guidelines regime thus achieves a high degree of systemic uniformity across
cases, but not at too great a reduction in individualized consideration of
the facts of the offense and the offender.2 29 If he cannot preserve the
Guidelines as sentencing factors because (over his objection) the Apprendi doctrine invalidates them, then he will maximize their uniformityseeking purpose to the fullest extent possible by saving real offense sentencing.230 This is why Justice Breyer maintains that Congress would prefer to have the detailed, real offense sentencing provisions of the
Guidelines retained in advisory form, rather than having no guidelines at
all. 231
The response of the remedial dissent further illustrates this clash of
foundational normative principles. 232 The primary congressional purposes behind enactment of the Guidelines, argues Justice Stevens, were
"the certainty of a binding regime and a deep suspicion of judges' ability
to reduce disparities" across cases. 233 Consequently, Congress specifically
defeated proposals for advisory guidelines of the very type the remedial
majority opinion creates. 234 Real offense sentencing, therefore, was an
instrumental, constitutive component of a regime of mandatory guidelines designed to reduce systemic disparities-not a sentencing end in
235
itself.
Based on this reasoning, the Booker remedial dissent argues that the
remedial majority characterizes congressional intent exactly backwards. 236 Had Congress understood that offense elements were the only
procedural tool available to constrain judicial sentencing authority, then
the Guidelines would have used them. 23 7 Justice Stevens does not call for
complete conversion of Guidelines factors into offense elements, but he
228. See id. at 254-56; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 555-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
229. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 251-52.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 246-48, 251-54.
232. See id. at 272-303 (Steven, J., dissenting); id. at 303-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 292 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234. See id. at 293-96.
235. See id. at 295-99. Justice Souter joined Justice Stevens' remedial dissent in full.
Justices Scalia and Thomas did not join the portion of Justice Stevens' opinion relying on
legislative history, but they agreed with his interpretation of Congress' intent in enacting
the Guidelines for textual reasons. See id. at 303 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 323-25
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg joined these four Justices in the majority in Apprendi and Blakely, joined Justices Stevens and Souter in joining Justice Thomas' dissent in
Harris, and joined the merits majority opinion in Booker itself. She parted ways with her
usual counterparts in the Booker remedial analysis, however, providing the deciding vote
to make Justice Breyer's remedial opinion the opinion for the Court. See Booker, 543 U.S.
at 245 n.*. She did not write separately to explain her reasoning. But see Susan R. Klein,
The Return of FederalJudicialDiscretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693,
716-17 (2005) (noting that "The $64,000 question is 'why did Justice Ginsburg defect?"'
and speculating on answers).
236. Booker, 543 U.S. at 272 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 304 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 297-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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maintains that Congress would want the Guidelines to be "Blakely-ized"
to the extent necessary to comply with the Blakely-Booker mandatorymaximums rule.2 38 Justice Scalia similarly emphasizes that Congress did
not enact real offense sentencing to assist judges, but rather to constrain
them, in achieving consistency in their individualized punishments.2 39 Although the remedial dissenters concede Congress's goal of ensuring
greater consistency among judges and systemic uniformity across cases,
their fundamental normative insistence on individualized punishment as
the objective of sentencing affects their assessment of the appropriate
Booker remedy.2 40 Rather than maximizing judicial discretion, which
joining the remedial majority in crafting advisory guidelines would seem
to better accomplish, they argued for Blakely-izing the Guidelines to retain the maximal amount of individualized punishment of offenders
2 41
within the uniformity-focused mandatory regime.
B.

BEYOND THE COURT: FUNDAMENTAL

IRRECONCILABILITY OF THE

NORMATIVE CLAIMS

Of course the clash between these opposing normative views inside the
walls of the Supreme Court is only a small portion of the extensive legal,
moral, and political deliberation over sentencing reform. The battle is
also waged in legislatures, academia, and debates conveyed in the popular media. No matter the forum, the normative dispute between proponents of the primacy of individualized punishment and the proponents of
the primacy of systemic uniformity remains intractable.
The reality is that these debates rarely have a clear winner when theory
is reduced to practice. On occasion one view attains prominence, and the
law achieves that objective at the expense of the other. This might be
true, for example, in jurisdictions that have all but eschewed sentencing
reform and continue to reserve nearly all second- and third-stage sentencing determinations to judges. The same might be said of jurisdictions that
238. See id. at 278-80, 286-89, 300-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting). That is, to the extent a
Guidelines provision delimits a mandatory maximum available penalty, it must be established as an element of the offense; to the extent the provision delimits a mandatory minimum available penalty, it may remain a sentencing factor. See, e.g., id. at 278-80 (giving
illustrative examples). Of course, this assertion about the limited Blakely-ization of the
Guidelines seems more strategic than genuine. Given that Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Thomas previously dissented in Harris, it seems clear that they would vote to extend
Blakely-Booker beyond the mandatory-maximums position to the full mandatory-effects
position advocated by the Harrisdissent. See supra note 105. Such a holding would essentially necessitate the complete Blakely-ization of the Guidelines because nearly all Guidelines provisions have the mandatory effect of altering the offense level and thereby the
bottom or top end (or both) of the mandatory sentencing range. Even further Blakelyization would be required in the criminal history provisions of the Guidelines in the seemingly inevitable event that the Court abrogates the still-extant "recidivism exception" to
the Apprendi-Blakely-Booker rule. See Priester, supra note 8, at 876-78; see also Shepard v.
United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1264 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that a majority
of the justices rejects the recidivism exception).
239. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 303-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
240. See id. at 300-05.
241. See id. at 303-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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were to adopt highly complex "Blakely-ized" mandatory guidelines that
codify nearly all second and third stage sentencing determinations. More
often a compromise is reached, and the competing claims are accommodated with a procedural or substantive solution that strikes a balance between pursuing individualized punishment and systemic uniformity. Such
compromises can include, for example, measures like advisory guidelines,
broad mandatory guidelines, or judicial discretion limited by a selection
of mandatory-minimum statutes but no formal guidelines.
Whatever degree of supremacy of one view or compromise between
the views that occurs in the practical design and implementation of sentencing law, all debates about the constitutional law of sentencing in particular, and sentencing reform in general, must take account of the stark
truth that the two views are premised upon irreconcilable normative
claims about the fundamental objective against which justice in sentencing must be measured.
Superficially, at least, it might seem that both views accept the validity
of the premise that justice requires that "similarly situated" offenders receive "similar" punishments for their crimes. If that were true, then the
dispute simply would involve the relative institutional competence of legislatures and courts to decide which cases count as "similar" and the level
2 42
of generality at which "similarity" should be assessed.
For example, it is easy to make the generalization that proponents of
the primacy of individualized punishment favor judges. They believe that
judges should decide which cases are similar because similarity should be
assessed with a high level of specificity to the facts of a particular caseeven if sometimes a systemic disparity seems to result because the same
facts are assessed differently by different judges.
The corresponding generalization about the proponents of the primacy
of systemic uniformity is equally easy to make: they favor legislatures.
They believe that legislatures should decide which cases are similar because a certain level of generality in assessing similarity is necessary to
ensure an acceptable level of systemic uniformity across all cases-even if
242. Of course, the decision about which cases count as similar, itself, depends on having made a prior decision about the purposes punishment the given sentencing regime
serves. See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 167 (2005); Marc
L. Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 424-25 (1992); Marc L. Miller,
Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L.J. 271, 272-75, 277 (2005); Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing Commission's Troubling Silence
About the Purposes of Punishment, 6 Bur'. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1069-70 (2003). One
often-cited fatal flaw in the origins of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was the Sentencing Commission's failure to specify the punishment purposes of the Guidelines before
seeking to proscribe unwarranted disparities among offenders. See, e.g., Kevin Cole, The
Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1336, 1336 (1997)
(holding that [t]he Commission's central preoccupation-with reducing sentencing disparity-requires a coherent underlying theory of punishment, because disparity is not a self-defining concept .... The problem with equality
is well known. Whether a particular state of affairs squares with equality requires elaboration of some additional, underlying theory of what is right.).
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sometimes an individual unfairness seems to result because different facts
are assessed the same by the sentencing laws.
As demonstrated by the tripartite analysis, however, superficial agreement is deceptive and the corresponding generalizations are inaccurate.
Not all those who favor individualized punishment trust judges; some of
them want highly detailed criminal codes or complex mandatory sentencing guidelines. Not all those who favor systemic uniformity trust legislatures; some of them prefer advisory guidelines or rigorous appellate
review as the means of achieving their goal.
At the same time, however, the appearance of a superficial agreement
between the two views helps identify the deeper conceptual divide between them. Although both views might rhetorically subscribe to the premise that similar punishments should be imposed in similar cases, in fact
the two views have fundamentally irreconcilable interpretations of what
that premise actually means.
Proponents of the primacy of individualized punishment argue that the
most important objective of sentencing is ensuring a just punishment for
each individual offender. Whether justice has been achieved is a question
of whether each individual offender has received the most appropriate
penalty on the facts and circumstances of his or her particular case. As
Professor Huigens has written, "The existence of discretion, somewhere
in the system, to make a context-sensitive evaluation of the offender's
conduct and character is intrinsic to criminal law because context-specific,
retrospective assessments of the offender and his wrongdoing are intrinsic
to just punishment. '243 That the system as a whole sometimes produces
disparities between what appear to be similar cases is deemed a price to
be paid for achieving the requisite degree of individualized treatment. If
each individual offender has received the most appropriate, highly contextualized punishment, then the system also is just. Thus, under this view
whether the sentencing system serves justice is derivative of whether individual offenders receive justice.
Fundamentally, then, the deepest normative premise of the individualized-sentencing view is that every case is unique and just punishment requires each case to be treated as such. No two cases are ever identical,
even if there are numerous readily identifiable intrinsic similarities between offenders and the details of their crimes. It follows that if there
always are differences between any two cases, then mandating that the
identical punishment be imposed on both offenders without regard to
those differences is unjust. Perceived disparity among cases is an illusion;
when the full details of each case are considered, the apparent similarities
vanish and the differential punishments are justified. In other words,
there is no such thing as "similarly situated" cases after all.
Proponents of the primacy of systemic uniformity, on the other hand,
assert that the most important objective of sentencing is ensuring the con243. Kyron Huigens, What Is and Is Not Pathologicalin Criminal Law, 101
REV.

811, 818 (2002).

MICH.
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sistency of punishments across the sentencing system as a whole. Whether
justice has been achieved is a question of whether consistently similar
punishments are imposed in similar cases and consistently different punishments are imposed in different cases. That individual offenders receive
less particularized consideration of every possible detail of their cases is
deemed a price to be paid for achieving the requisite level of systemic
uniformity. If like cases are treated alike across the system, then the punishment imposed on each individual offender also is just. Thus, under this
view whether the individual offender receives justice is derivative of
whether the system as a whole achieves systemic uniformity.
Fundamentally, then, the deepest normative premise of the systemicuniformity view is that the facts and circumstances of individual offenders' cases are irrelevant to just punishment for the same offense of conviction. There is no injustice in punishing identical offenses the same,
even if there are numerous readily identifiable extrinsic differences between the offenders and the details of their crimes. Justice does not require any consideration of individual situations beyond proof of the
elements of the offense of conviction; in fact, permitting capacity for individual defendants to argue for a special punishment in their particular
cases would create an injustice by undermining the systemic uniformity
necessary to just punishment of all offenders. In other words, "similar"
has no legally cognizable normative content beyond the definitions of
"similarity" enacted in positive law.
These foundational normative premises are irreconcilable. The deepest
claims of the individualized-punishment view give primacy to the uniqueness of each case and necessarily reject the need for any meaningful consistency across offenders. The deepest claims of the systemic-uniformity
view, on the other hand, necessarily reject the demand for meaningful
assessment of the unique facts and circumstances of any particular case
beyond those deemed relevant by positive law and give primacy to the
goal of consistency and uniformity in the treatment of all offenders in the
system.
This fundamental irreconcilability of normative premises has profound
implications for the constitutional law of sentencing and debates over
sentencing reform. Of course, pragmatic bargains and practical compromises between the views are possible, and occur with some frequency
in legislative debates over sentencing policy. Yet such accommodations of
competing claims are only that-concessions of principles to achieve
workable practical outcomes. To mistake pragmatic politics for normative
agreement only invites further confusion and discord in future debates
about sentencing law and policy.
C.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The tripartite analysis and its critique of the Court's new constitutional
law of sentencing have several important implications for the future of
sentencing law and policy, and sentencing reform measures in particular.
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Specifically, the analysis demonstrates the necessity of rolling back the
scope of the Court's constitutional doctrines. By expanding judicial
power in the constitutional law of sentencing beyond its proper bounds,
the Court has distorted the Rule into a more restrictive constitutional
principle than is necessary to preserve an offender's rights and the structure of institutional powers relating to sentencing. The Rule therefore
should be limited to its original Apprendi-Harrisscope, and the subsequent Blakely-Booker expansion should be overturned. The constitutional law of sentencing will then make sense formalistically, and its
functional effects will return to their appropriately limited scope.
As for the future of sentencing reform more generally, the tripartite
analysis helps to sharpen the terms of political and scholarly debate. Controversies regarding first-stage adjudications of offense elements and second-stage adjudications of additional punishment facts can be addressed
on their terms-but they likely often will be overwhelmed by the significance of the controversies regarding third-stage normative value decisions. Efforts to design sentencing regimes to balance the competing
objectives of individualized punishment and systemic uniformity will benare deefit from greater precision in delineating which kinds of reform
244
sired or necessary at which stages of the sentencing process.
In addition, recognizing the fundamental irreconcilability of the two
normative premises has profound implications for the constitutional law
of sentencing and debates over sentencing reform. While pragmatic bargains and practical compromises between the views are possible, such accommodations of competing claims are not at all the same as prescribing
or prohibiting any given solution as a matter of federal constitutional law.
In fact, the fundamental irreconcilability of these two normative positions
makes it all the more important for constitutional law to be removed
from the equation-at least absent a convincing argument that the Constitution itself mandates the triumph of one view over the other.
V. CONCLUSION
In the Apprendi line of cases, the United States Supreme Court has
relied upon the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury to promulgate a new constitutional law of sentencing. Unfortunately, the Court's
invocation of that hallowed right is pretextual. The statutory provisions
deemed unconstitutional by the new doctrine do not infringe any power
of the jury, but only the dearly held power of the sentencing judge. Under
the guise of preserving the role of the jury, then, the Court actually has
protected its own institutional turf.
The true nature of the Court's crass power grab is exposed by a tripartite analysis of the decisions involved in sentencing a convicted offender.
First, the adjudication of offense-element facts establishes a conviction
244. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 120, at 47-48; Chanenson, Next Era, supra note 168,
at 386-400 (discussing struggles to balance systemic uniformity and individualized punishment when designing sentencing regimes); Reitz, supra note 154, at 156-71.
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for the charged crime. Next, additional facts bearing on punishment are
adjudicated separately. Finally, normative value decisions establish the
legal and moral worth of those facts to determine the particular penalty
to be imposed on the offender. Subjecting the new constitutional law of
sentencing to scrutiny through the perspective of this tripartite framework reveals the full implications of the Court's actions. It diminished
legislative power in favor of sentencing judges. Moreover, it has altered
the landscape of sentencing reform by disrupting the balance between
competing concerns for individualized punishment and systemic uniformity. Without valid basis, the Court has decreed as federal constitutional
law a specific, contestable, and highly controversial normative vision of
the nature of criminal sentencing.
The Court has distorted the constitutional requirement imposed by the
Apprendi line of cases into a more restrictive principle than is justified.
The original, limited nature of the principle should be preserved, and the
more recent expansion to invalidate other sentencing provisions, including the federal guidelines, should be abandoned. The constitutional law of
sentencing will be formalistically and functionally superior as a result, and
sentencing reform debates nationwide will once again be free from the
menacing shadow of arbitrary and illogical doctrinal restrictions.

272

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

Casenotes

,,tAS.

1

